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Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties 
in Strategic Alliances 
By George W Dent, ]1: * 
Strategic alliances-including joint ventures, franchises, dealerships, distribu-
torships, licensing arrangements, and "strategic investments"-are nothing new; 
they have existed for centuries. In recent years, though, they have proliferated 
and their importance has mushroomed because of economic and technological 
changes. Alliances now "account for more than 20% of the average large firm's 
revenues." 1 This growth is not surprising because most strategic alliances are 
profitable.2 We are witnessing not quite the birth but certainly the ascent of an 
entity (or, more precisely, a related group of entities) distinct from both traditional 
business entities (corporations and partnerships) and from newer entities like the 
limited liability company. 
This ascent challenges the law. The central task of the law of business associ-
ations is to establish gap fillers (or default rules) and fiduciary duties for relations 
among their owners3 How well the law meets this challenge deeply .influences 
economic growth.4 
This Article describes the evolution of strategic alliances and their dependence 
on trust between the allies. It then discusses the general theory of gap fillers and 
* Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Business Organizations, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. The author thanks Doug Branson and Tamar Frankel for their helpful comments. 
l. Steven I. Glover, Negotiating and Structuring joint Ventures: Lessons from Management Consultants, 
M & A lAWYER, Mar. 1998, at 1, 4 (predicting this figure to be attained by the year 2000 and noting 
a twenty percent annual increase in the value of strategic alliances involving Fortune 1000 companies 
in recent years). 
2. I d. at 4 (reporting that "the return on joint venture investments is 17 percent," which is "higher 
than the rate of return on other corporate activities"); see also Su Han Chan eta!., Do Strategic Alliances 
Create Value?, 46]. FIN. EcoN. 199, 209-13 (1997) (showing that stock prices of both partners usually 
rise following announcement of a strategic alliance). 
3. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. The law of business organizations also sets default 
rules for liability of organizations and their owners to third parties. Professor Ribstein proposes rec-
ognition of a new class of business association-the "contractual entity"-whose owners would enjoy 
limited liability to creditors of the entity, as do corporate shareholders. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited 
Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL.]. CoRP. L. 407, 435-46 (1999). This "contractual entity" would include 
many strategic alliances that would not be categorized as partnerships, corporations, or limited liability 
companies. Id. 
4. Thus in comparing the economic performances of different nations, john Coffee concludes that 
"law matters." john C. Coffee, Jr., P1ivatization and C01porate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 ]. CoRP. L. 1, 1 (1999). That is, the law of business associations and securities 
regulation "can somehow better promote economic efficiency than can reliance on financial contracting 
alone." ld. at 4. Certain legal systems outperform others in this regard. Jd. at 2. 
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fiduciary duties and the inevitability of major gaps in strategic alliance contracts. 
Finally, it combines these elements to derive conclusions about the proper role of 
gap fillers and fiduciary duties in strategic alliances. 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND THEIR PROLIFERATION 
WHAT ARE STRATEGIC ALLIANCES? 
"Strategic alliance" is a business term. Business lawyers use it by necessity, but 
it has no legal definition. It has been described as an arrangement "whereby two 
or more firms agree to pool their resources to pursue specific market opportu-
nities."5 This Article will use a slightly narrower definition of strategic alliance as 
a sustained relationship in which the agreed performance of each party is complex 
and largely autonomous and each party has a profit interest.6 The vagueness of 
this description is inevitable if artificial lines are to be avoided. 
The archetypal strategic alliance is the joint venture. In law, a true joint venture 
is usually treated as a general partnership except that it generally connotes a single 
project rather than a broad, continuous business relationship.7 Unlike most part-
nerships, most joint ventures have business associations rather than individuals 
as members. The joint enterprise is often incorporated, in which case it is called 
a "joint venture corporation"8 and is legally a corporation, not a partnership. 
The legal status of strategic alliances other than joint ventures-including 
manufacturing and distribution arrangements (franchises, dealerships, and li-
censes),9 and strategic investments10-is often unclear. "The receipt by a person 
of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner 
in the business .... "11 Although a franchise, for example, may entail sharing of 
5. Ranjay Gulati, Does Familia1ity Breed Tmst? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual 
Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. j. 85 (1995); see also ALAN 5. GUTTERMAN, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S 
GUIDE TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1.001 (1997) (referring to a "process of accessing" complementary 
assets and resources of two or more firms "in order to efficiently and rapidly implement the innovation 
process"). 
6. Allies need not share profits from a single pool. In a dealership, distributorship, franchise, or 
licensing agreement, for example, each party seeks profit, but not from one pool. This definition omits 
some arrangements that fall under the definition used by Gulali, as when one firm performs research 
for another firm for a fee rather than for a profit interest. See Gulati, sttpra note 5. 
7. In both the UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914) § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995) and UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1994) 
§ 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 2001) "partnership" is defined as "an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. ... " "[T]he joint venture, if 
distinguished from a partnership at all, must be categorized as a business association similar to the 
partnership but more narrow in purpose and scope." HAROLD GILL REusCHLEIN &: WILLIAM A. GREG-
ORY, THE lAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 451 (2d ed. 1990) (footnote omitted); see also 1 RICHARD 
D. HARROCH, PARTNERSHIP &: jOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS § 2.09(2), at 2-73 (1992); GUTTERMAN, 
supra note 5, at 11.001-.035. 
8. HARROCH, supra note 7, at 2-75. 
9. For a discussion of these arrangements see GuTTERMAN, supra note 5, at 8.001-.058, 10.001-
.031; see also Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective on the Types 
and Purposes of Technology Joint Ventures, 61 ANTITRUST L.j. 861, 864-68 (1993) (listing different types 
of alliances). 
lO. For a discussion of strategic investments see GUTTERMAN, supra note 5, at 12.001-.027. 
11. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914) § 7(4), 6 U.L.A. 280 (1995); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1994) § 202(c)(3) 
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2001). 
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profits, in general a franchisor is not a co-owner of the franchise. If a franchisor 
de facto controls the franchisee, however, the latter may be deemed the agent of 
the former, who then is liable for the debts of the franchisee. 12 
Unlike corporations, alliances are not government chartered; and unlike part-
nerships, they have no statutory definition, so the boundaries of the definition 
are hazy. When, for example, does an investment by one company in another 
become a "strategic investment" worthy to be called an alliance? A major equity 
stake and close cooperation between the investor and the issuer are not enough; 
these features are common in venture capital investments that are not considered 
strategic alliances. The investor's further interest as a current or potential customer 
or potential acquirer of the issuer is needed. 13 
Strategic alliances often involve international trade, or high technology research 
and development, or both. In the past most distribution agreements involved 
parties of very different sizes performing separate functions. Duties could usually 
be fairly well defined by contract and each performance could reasonably be 
monitored by the other party so that breaches could be fairly easily detected. The 
victim of a breach could then sue for damages or terminate the contract and seek 
a substitute contract with another party. If a hamburger franchisee performs 
poorly, for example, the franchisor with a nationwide chain can cancel the fran-
chise and quickly find a new franchisee. 
As the word "alliance" suggests, strategic alliances tend to involve closer co-
operation and parties of more equal size. 14 The goals of alliances (like developing 
new technology or promoting a product in a foreign market) require inputs (like 
research or marketing skill) that are harder to define and to monitor than in more 
traditional relational contracts. Contracts are, therefore, harder to draft and 
breaches harder to detect and prove in strategic alliances. 
In the past these problems were addressed by integrating the needed inputs 
within a firm_ Is Strategic alliances involve situations where this solution will not 
work. If a domestically-owned firm is needed by a foreign company to enter a 
national market, acquiring the domestic firm would eliminate its domestic own-
ership. A company that needs some technical skill may not need the skill providers 
full-time for an indefinite period. By entering into strategic alliances, the skill 
providers can benefit many partners rather th::in being employees of just one. 
When an alliance ceases to be profitable (perhaps because a discrete project has 
been completed), it is terminated; the skill purchaser need not divest assets or 
fire employees. Skill providers often prefer to remain independent within an al-
liance with a firm rather than becoming employees of the firm both for psycho-
12.. See ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AGENCY, AsSOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS 112.-13 
(4th ed. 1987) {listing cases imposing vicarious liability on franchisors) . 
. 13. See KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR jOINT VENTURES 2.1-2.2. (1985) (discussing mo-
tiV~s for strategic investments); see also Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: 
Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry, 5 j.L. EcoN. &: ORG. 109 (1989). 
14. See Glover, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that fifty-fifty joint ventures tend to be more successful). 
15. Ronald Coase first argued that firms exist to overcome the problems of trading in markets. 
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Finn, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392. (193 7); see also infra notes 2.7-2.8 and 
accompanying text (discussing asset specificity). 
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logical reasons and because it is easier to devise effective incentive compensation 
in a small firm than in a large firm. 16 
Firms in an alliance are also more likely to come from different industries than 
the parties in more traditional relational contracts. In the past, firms in different 
industries generally dealt with each other through sales contracts, but ordinary 
sales contracts are often inadequate where close cooperation is needed to integrate 
or develop sophisticated information or technology. Relationships are more com-
plex when the parties come from different industries. The cultures of the two 
industries may differ in many respects, including contracting conventionsY 
For all the above reasons strategic alliances depend on mutual trust more than 
do people in a firm or parties to a sales contract. Because alliances require closer 
cooperation than ordinary sales contracts but lack the hierarchy of a firm, each 
side is vulnerable to opportunism by the other. And because a party's duties often 
involve specialized skills, it may be hard for the victim of a breach to find a 
substitute partner. For all these reasons there is a greater need for courts to fill 
gaps in the contract and to curb opportunism with fiduciary principles in strategic 
alliances than in other relationships. 
WHY Do STRATEGIC ALLIANCES EXIST? 
Strategic alliances pose a paradox: under classic financial theory, they should 
not exist. In theory, business is transacted either in markets or in firms; 18 a firm 
chooses to "make-or-buy" each input it needs. 19 Strategic alliances fit neither cate-
gory20 Recognition of a third mode of business activity is not entirely new. Com-
mentators have long noted the existence of long-term "relational contracts" that 
differ markedly from the single-transaction contracts that markets comprise, but 
whose parties are independent rather than integrated within a firm. 21 
In some ways strategic alliances are relational contracts: both are long-term 
transactions between independent parties. Alliances, however, so differ from tra-
ditional "relational contracts" that it is misleading to give them that label. The 
classic relational contract is an on-going sales arrangement between a customer 
16. See jOSEPH L BADARACCO, jR., THE KNOWLEDGE LiNK: HOW FIRMS COMPETE THROUGH STRA-
TEGIC ALLIANCES 104 (1991) (merging a smaller firm into a larger may eliminate the "independence, 
and entrepreneurship on which a [smaller] firm's special capabilities rest."). 
17. Even in the same industry companies from different countries may opt for an alliance over a 
merger because of different cultures. See Bengt Holmstrom&: John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm 
Revisited, 12 j. EcoN. PERSP. 73, 84 (1998) (referring to alliances between airlines from different 
countries). 
18. See, e.g., OLiVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS (1975) (discussing the division of business activity between firms (which he calls "hierar-
chies") and markets). 
19. See Gulati, supra note 5, at 86. 
20. See Ribstein, supra note 3, at 414 ("[T]here is a continuum of 'firm-ness' rather than a strict 
dichotomy between firms and non-firms .... The franchise contract is a classic example of a hybrid 
of firm and non-firm.") (footnotes omitted). 
2 L See generally Charles ]. Goetz &: Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L 
REv. 1089 (1981). 
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and a supplier; each performs a distinct function in the chain of production22 In 
most alliances the parties' relationship is more symbiotic. In a research and de-
velopment joint venture, for example, the partners combine strengths in different 
technologies to create a new product. Although the line between the two is not 
always clear, strategic alliances usually entail a more complex undertaking and 
closer cooperation and integration of activity between the parties. Strategic alli-
ances, however, can also be tailored to limit collaboration so that even competitors 
can cooperate. For instance, a consortium of auto manufacturers worked together 
in order to reduce auto pollution more quickly and cheaply than they could have 
separately while they still competed in sales.23 
The distinct features of alliances are dictated by the parties' pursuit of goals 
that they cannot achieve as well in ordinary sales or in a firm. Sales contracts are 
not well suited, for example, for transfers of confidential information. They require 
a seller to fully reveal the product to a potential buyer. With confidential infor-
mation that is impossible because once the information is disclosed, the transfer 
has already occurred.24 An arrangement in which the seller accepts a share of the 
profits from the use of information is preferable because it offers the buyer some 
assurance of the value of the information. Market transactions are also problematic 
when the required performance is so vague, complex, or dependent on future 
uncertainties that it cannot be precisely specified in a contract25 
Finally, markets work poorly for undertakings that require "team production"-
that is, projects requiring several members, each of whom will "make an irrevo-
cable commitment of resources to the joint enterprise. "26 Such a "relation-specific" 
investment may be of a capital asset27 One who makes such a commitment is 
vulnerable to hold-up: the other party may refuse to pay an adequate price for 
use of the asset, and the owner cannot then seek another user because the asset 
is relation-specific. 28 
22. See id. at 1095. 
23. See generally Gary Hamel eta!., Collaborate with Your Competitors-and Win, HARV. Bus. REv., 
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 134-35. 
24. See Jean-Francais Hennart, A Transaction Costs The01y of Equity joint Ventures, 9 STRATEGIC 
MGMT.]. 361, 365 (1988) ("If the seller were to provide that information in order to educate the 
buyer on the value of the know-how for sale, he would, by revealing the information, be transferring 
the know-how free of charge.") (citation omitted). "[Mierely informing a potential buyer about one's 
product gives away a great deal of the benefit. Hence, information is shared alongside sheaves of 
nondisclosure agreements, and, even then, there is selective hiding of crt tical components." Richard 
]. Zeckhauser, The Challenge of Contracting for Technological Information, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 
USA 12,743, 12,744 (1996), quoted in Karen Eggleston eta!., Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts 
17-18 n.53 Oan. 18, 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications/Working/ 
index.html (unpublished manusclipt); see also Steven R. Salbu & Richard A. Brahm, Strategic Consid-
erations in Designing joint Venture Contracts, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253, 272 (1992) (stating that 
technology joint ventures "often involve the use of organizationally embedded knowledge or sophis-
ticated technology that is difficult to exchange efficiently through arms-length market mechanisms") 
(footnote omitted). Mere disclosure is not always the sole objective, though. For example, a buyer 
may know all about a patented device but need the permission of the patent holder to use it. 
25. See WILliAMSON, supra note 18, at 20-24, 75. 
26. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 24]. CoRP. L. 
751, 768 (1999). 
27. See Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 17, at 74. 
28. 'The more specialized the investment, the lower its value in its next best use. This heightens 
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Consider, for example, a McDonald's restaurant. Its value is enhanced by ex-
hibiting brand signs and symbols (like the golden arches) well known to custom-
ers, but a full display of these signs and symbols is expensive. If a restaurant 
owner purchases them, McDonald's could promptly forbid her to use the McDon-
ald's name and then offer to buy the restaurant for far less than its cost. Whether 
or not she accepts, the owner suffers a large loss. The owner's investment (in-
cluding costs of advertising and other marketing efforts) can also be damaged if 
McDonald's approves a competing restaurant next door to it. To avoid such op-
portunism franchisees seek assurance that their franchises will not be arbitrarily 
canceled and will enjoy some protection from competition. 
A reputation for quality may increase a manufacturer's profits, but to achieve 
and retain this reputation it must ensure quality at the distribution level. To do 
so, a manufacturer may sell through franchisees who maintain its standards.29 
Thus, the manufacturer can get better distribution with a limited number of fran-
chisees than by selling to anyone who will buy its products. 
Many projects need a long-term commitment of brain-power from one or many 
people. This need complicates the exchanging of information: when knowledge 
is "embedded in the individual possessing it[,] ... its exchange must rely on 
intimate human contact."3° Commitments of firm-specific human capital face the 
same danger as commitments of tangible assets, though. That is, one who develops 
skills useful to only one project is vulnerable to the opportunism of the party who 
hires those skills. 31 
In such cases parties may create a firm-i.e., "a team use of inputs and a 
centralized position of some party in the contractual arrangements of all other 
inputs."32 Diseconomies of scale limit the size of firms, though. In larger firms it 
is harder for managers to gather and digest information and to offer optimal 
incentives to employees, especially employees who perform sophisticated tasks 
that others cannot easily monitor. 33 Whether these problems make a hierarchy 
(i.e., firm) unsuitable depends on the size of the project and the kind of inputs 
it needs. It may also depend on the participants' skill in devising an alliance that 
is more efficient than a firm for the project. 
The limitations of market transactions and of firms define the range of situations 
in which strategic alliances are the most efficient solution. They offer economies 
the risk of opportunistic behavior .... " Thomas M. Palay, Compamtive Institutional Economics: The 
Govemance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13]. LEGAL Sruo. 265, 266 (1984); see also Hennart, supra note 
24, at 367 (discussing use of franchises where "distribution requires substantial up-front investments"); 
see generally PETER LORANCE & jOHAN Roos, STRATEGIC ALUANCES: FORMATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
EVOLUTION 207 (1992) (discussing sunk costs of dealers and franchisees). 
29. See Hennart, supra note 24, at 368 (discussing importance of quality-control over distributors); 
Paul H. Rubin, The Theo1y of the Finn and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 2lj.L. & EcoN. 223, 
228 (1978) (same). 
30. Hennart, supra note 24, at 366. 
31. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37-41 (Alan Auerbach ed., 1988) (stating that employees 
are vulnerable to breach of implicit employment contracts). 
32. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, lnfonnation Costs and Economic Organization, 
62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 778 (1972) (emphasis omitted). 
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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of scale that cannot be realized through market transactions.34 Alliances typically 
involve transfers of knowledge and commitments of major assets, especially hu-
man capital, that are not well suited to market exchanges. If, for example, Zilchco 
wants widgets of a quality that is widely available, a purchase contract with a 
manufacturer is probably the best way to obtain them. If, however, Zilchco needs 
a new, improved widget, and if cooperation between Zilchco and a producer can 
help to develop the new widget, it may be impossible to spell out in a purchase 
contract what each party should do and receive under all possible contingencies 
and then to confirm whether each party has fully performed. 
Integrating two firms by a merger may not be optimal, either. If widgets are 
only part of the manufacturer's output, a merger may lead to inefficiencies in 
other products which Zilchco does not understand.35 The two companies may 
also have different cultures that would clash after merger.36 Of course, the same 
problem may infect a strategic alliance between the two firms, but in that case 
the problem is limited to the joint project. 
In such cases two parties can create a joint entity in which both share profits 
but which is controlled by one party, but that party could exploit control to reduce 
the return to the junior partner. If instead the junior receives a guaranteed return 
for its input, it has an incentive to shirk in its efforts. If the junior's performance 
is hard to define and monitor, the controlling partner may then be unable to prove 
a contractual breach by the junior. Therefore, the best arrangement in such cases 
may be neither market exchanges nor a firm subject to the control of only one 
party, but instead an arrangement in which the parties share both control and 
profits-i.e., a strategic alliance. 
For example, franchises, dealerships, and distributorships are often used where 
a supplier could not easily monitor an employee managing a distribution outlet.37 
Unlike an employee on salary, a franchisee can assume much of the risk of success 
or failure of the outlet38 The resulting incentives substitute for monitoring by the 
34. See Hennart, supra note 24, at 363 (describing use of joint ventures to achieve economies 
of scale). 
35. Id. at 371 (joint venture often used if a merger "would force the acquirer to enter unrelated 
fields or to suddenly expand in size, with the attendant management problems"); BADARACCO, supra 
note 16, at lOS (same). 
36. See BADARAcco, supra note 16, at 67. These problems are additional to the problems that always 
confront mergers, such as what to do with two sets of managers when only one is now needed. 
37. "[F]ranchising is usually undertaken in situations where the franchisee is physically removed 
from the franchisor, and thus where monitoring of the performance and behavior of the franchisee 
would be difficult." Rubin, supra note 29, at 226. For example, it may be hard for a franchisor to 
detect that a franchisee is free-riding on the efforts of the franchisor and other franchisees by skimping 
on service to customers. See Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract En-
forcement Mechanisms, 31 ].L & EcoN. 265, 270-76 (1988). The franchisee may also know important 
local information that the franchisor lacks, such as the best location for an outlet, optimum hours of 
operation, and the performance of employees. Id. 
38. "[W]e would expect the franchise contract to be written in such a way as to give the franchisee 
much of the profits in the operation." Rubin, supra note 29, at 226; see also james A. Brickley & 
Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Fonn: The Case of Franchising, 18]. FIN. EcoN. 401, 
405 Cl987) (ascribing use of franchises to the strong incentives they give franchisees to maximize 
profi!S); Holmstrom & RoberiS, supra note 17, at 87-88 (same). The franchisee's substantial investment 
m the franchise bonds its commitment to work hard. Id. 
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supplier. Even where a merger may make sense, the parties may refrain because 
of initial uncertainty about each other. A strategic alliance may serve as a trial 
cohabitation to resolve their doubts about whether to marry.39 
The nature and function of alliances become clearer if we view markets and 
firms not as distinct categories but as parts of a continuum of contracts. In this 
view "[t)he private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships."40 This taxonomy eschews a view 
of markets, alliances, and firms as uniform within each category and unrelated to 
other categories. Rather within each category arrangements vary; some resemble 
certain arrangements in other categories more than some arrangements in their 
own category. For example, a joint venture may be more similar to a firm than it 
is to a distributorship, even though joint ventures and distributorships are both 
labeled strategic alliances. 
The "nexus of contracts" ta..-xonomy may be misleading in some ways, though. 
Contracts in spot markets generally trigger no fiduciary duties and involve little 
trust between the parties. Firms are different in both respects. Treating both firms 
and market transactions as contracts may blind us to the different expectations 
that parties have in different arrangements, differences to which the law should 
pay heed. 
Strategic investments can facilitate project financing. Debt financing is unsuit-
able for a firm that is a high risk or whose assets are mostly firm-specific so that 
they could not be seized and sold by a creditor after default. 41 Public equity 
financing is unavailable for firms whose capital needs are too small to justify the 
costs of a public stock offering. The only remaining option is private equity fi-
nancing, which entrepreneurs often obtain from venture capitalists. A small firm, 
however, may prefer to raise money from a larger firm in its industry. The large 
industrial firm may offer better technical and marketing advice and other assis-
tance. A large firm in the same industry may also understand the small firm's 
technology and commercial prospects better than a venture capitalist does. 42 The 
two firms may also have a customer-supplier relationship that is strengthened by 
the large firm's investment in the smaller. Finally, an investment may help the 
parties get acquainted and decide if they wish to merge. 43 Despite these advantages 
of alliances, we will see that they also pose some dangers, and the magnitude of 
those dangers depends in part on how alliances are treated by the law. 
CAUSES OF THE PROLIFERATION OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Several factors have combined to cause a proliferaticon of strategic alliances. 
Extensive integration of firms fell from favor, but the need grew for greater co-
39. See Glover, supra note l, at 8 (stating that a strategic alliance allows a potential purchaser to 
"decide in a methodical, careful way whether it wants to make an acquisition"). 
40. Michael C. jensen /Sr. William]. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structttre, 3]. FtN. EcoN. 305, 311 (1976) (emphasis omitted). 
41. See Hennart, supra note 24, at 368-69 (describing use of joint ventures where debt financing 
is not feasible). 
42. See GUTIERMAN, supra note 5, at 12.001. 
4 3. See id. at 12.023-.024. 
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ordination of production than market transactions could offer. Meanwhile, the 
ability to draft strategic alliance contracts to meet this need improved. These 
developments warrant discussion. 
During the 1960s and '70s many companies expanded, often through acqui-
sitions. Three justifications were given for firm growth. First, expanding a com-
pany's existing lines of business generated economies of scale; many equated 
bigness with efficiency. Second, if a firm added new lines of business that were 
related to the old, it could realize efficiencies through better coordination of the 
two lines than is possible in market transactions between separate firms. Third, 
even if the new lines were unrelated to the old (i.e., "conglomerate" growth), 
profits could be increased through improved management. Many claimed that 
managerial talent was unitary; it mattered not whether the firm produced sausages 
or advertising campaigns. 
It is unclear whether people making these claims (especially the last) really 
believed them or merely used them as pretexts for growth that benefitted man-
agers personally but not shareholders. 44 In any case, it is now generally conceded 
that different knowledge and skills are needed to manage different kinds of busi-
nesses.45 Combining different lines of business in one company is more likely to 
diminish than to increase profits. 
Further, economies of scale and coordination do not increase infinitely but 
decline after some point. As a firm grows it gets harder, not easier, for managers 
to gather and digest all material information. 46 Diseconomies of scale are even 
more common under modem technology: "the large factories of the past are being 
replaced by smaller-scale, more flexible technologies .... "47 One reason for this 
is the growing importance of knowledge, or human capital: "because of advances 
in information technology, agents who were previously engaged in routine tasks 
need to be motivated to make wise decisions on the basis of the increasing amount 
of information at their disposal."48 It is easier in smaller, specialized firms than in 
huge conglomerates to motivate agents by closer monitoring and by offering com-
pensation schemes that reward good work.49 The acceleration of change also dis-
favors integration because it is often faster to access the skills of another firm than 
to develop it from scratch on one's own. 5° 
44. See jOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 2-6 (1967) (arguing that firm 
growth benefits managers); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY 201 (1995) (stating that as a firm grows "the firm's bureaucracy develops a stake in its 
own survival rather than profit maximization"). 
45. See Bob Tedeschi, What's That Noise on the Intemet? The Sound of Alliances Being Forged, N.Y. 
TIMES, june 7, 2000, at H25 (stating that companies now "don't want to be the jack-of-all-trades"). 
46. See Alchian & Dernsetz, supra note 32. 
47. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 53 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
48. Id.; see generally William G. Ouchi, A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational 
Control Mechanisms, 25 MGMT. Sci. 833 (1979) (discussing the problems of a hierarchical firm when 
a person's performance is difficult to define by contract and to evaluate). 
49. See BADARACCO, supra note 16, at 140-43. 
50. See Tedeschi, supra note 45 (stating that "stopping to develop expertise in any given area is 
tantamount to suicide"). 
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Large firms make sense only when they control significant non-human assets, 
as in "smoke stack" industries. 51 Firms without significant non-human assets tend 
to be unstable. 52 Tangible assets, like a mine or a factory, are usually difficult to 
share among several users. The knowledge and skill of an individual or a team 
can be shared by several users, though, so there is less need to put this asset 
under the control of a single user. New technologies require less capital invest-
ment53 The increasing importance of human capital, therefore, abets the prolif-
eration of smaller, more specialized firms. Economic globalization also aids this 
trend. The global market is large enough to support firms that are too specialized 
to survive in any national market. As a result there has been movement in recent 
years away from industrial integration and toward specialization. 54 
At the same time, globalization increases the need for cooperation. More com-
panies want to sell their products in foreign countries, but because of protectionist 
laws and a company's ignorance of a foreign market it may need a local partner 
to help with sales in that market. Globalization also subjects many companies to 
increased foreign competition at home. To meet growing competition, many firms 
seek additional inputs (especially technology), but integration often is not best 
way to obtain these inputs, for the reasons just discussed. 
Spot market transactions are not always optimal for this purpose. Spot markets 
work well for commodities whose features and price are well established. These 
conditions rarely exist for technology and human capital. Often a seller cannot 
disclose the nature of the product because the disclosure itself is what the buyer 
wants. 55 Also, technology is valuable only if it is rare; there is no reason to pay 
for it if equivalent technology is freely available. But markets set prices only for 
fungible goods, so there cannot be a market price for a unique item. Further, 
there cannot be a sale of technology that does not yet exist. To develop new 
technology, some other arrangement is needed. 
Trading human capital in spot markets is even more problematic. Humans 
cannot be bought and sold. They can be hired temporarily without becoming 
employees, but this solution does not work when a person's services are needed 
for a long time. Further, many tasks are too complicated to be handled by one 
person and must be tackled by a team. Large team projects (like major building 
construction) can sometimes be achieved through ordinary contracts with finns. 
Many projects, though, are too complicated to be specified by ordinary contracts. 
ln theory these trends lead to the virtual corporation: a firm with no employees 
beyond a management team and no assets beyond what this team needs to func-
51. See HART, supra note 47, at 56-59. 
52. See id. at 58-59. 
53. See id. at 53. 
54. See id.; Claudia H. Deutsch, Clewing Out the Kitchen Sink: Conglomerates Learn to Pick Their 
Spots, N.Y. TIMES, july 29, 1997, at Dl (describing the trend of deconglomeration). This trend out-
weighs the simultaneous proliferation of mergers. Moreover, in recent years there have been fewer 
conglomerate mergers. At least in horizontal mergers, firms become larger but not more integrated, 
so that the surviving firm may need external outputs as much as the constituent firms did. 
55. See Hennart, supra note 24. 
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tion. This management team contracts for all of the firm's other inputs. 56 The 
virtual corporation, then, epitomizes the concept of the firm as a legal fiction, a 
mere nexus of contracts.57 The virtual corporation's potential is limited because 
its dependence on market exchanges makes it "inherently more adversarial, more 
non-cooperative, than is the traditional vertical structure. "56 Strategic alliances can 
overcome this problem by being more cooperative without incurring the problems 
of the integrated firm. 
Strategic alliances have also grown because better contracts are available, aided 
by the increasing experience of many lawyers, the publication of treatises, 59 and 
the creation of training programs for lawyers. 60 The expansion of business fosters 
higher expertise through greater specialization among lawyers. Word processing, 
facsimile transmission, electronic mail, computer-assisted research, and duplicat-
ing equipment have facilitated the drafting and negotiation of better contracts. 
These same forces also facilitate alliances by improving the exchange of infor-
mation and, thus, coordination between partners. 61 
TRUST IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
TRUST IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
At first blush trust may seem too naive a concept for the hard, cold world of 
business. As Oliver Williamson says: "Indeed, I maintain that trust is irrelevant 
to commercial exchange and that reference to trust in this connection promotes 
confusion."62 However, social scientists now widely agree that trust is essential to 
the successful functioning of business and of society generally. 
Trust is most obviously important in individual relationships. Spouses could 
never fully specify their duties in a contract and then monitor each other's com-
pliance. Doing business with friends and relatives whom one can trust offers clear 
advantages. In many societies most business is conducted within such relation-
56. See john A. Byrne et al., The Virtual Corporation, Bus. WI<., Feb. 8, 1993, at 98; Holmstrom & 
Roberts, supra note 17, at 85 (discussing some examples of virtual corporations); see generally Ann E. 
Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL]. CoRP. L. 497 (1997). 
57. See jensen&: Meckling, supra note 40, at 311 (discussing that nexus-of-contracts theory sees 
the firm as a "legal fiction"). 
58. Claire Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual Organization and Conflicting Gov-
ernance Vectors, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 759, 762 (1997). In particular, virtual corporations do not share 
profits with suppliers; see id. at 796-98. 
59. See, e.g., GuTTERMAN, supra note 5; HARROCH, supra note 7. 
60. See, e.g., STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING, AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES (Practising Law 
lnst., 1996) (a volume of materials prepared for program of the same name), available at http:// 
www.pli.org. 
61. See Tedeschi, supra note 45 (quoting businessman Charles Conn saying that "the new infor-
mation technologies allow for better coordination between firms"). 
62. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 j.L. & EcoN. 453, 
469 (1993); see FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 149 (citing MAx WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 
277, 338-51 (Transaction Books 1981), as espousing this view); cf. Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic 
Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.j. 547 (1993). 
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ships.63 In the global, technologically sophisticated modem economy, though, 
trust must be broader. 64 
The order of law alone, it has come to be pretty clear, is not enough in itself 
to sustain a market economy: a capitalist system also requires what might 
be called an order of custom-a cultural infrastructure of norms, learned 
dispositions to respect property and keep promises and pay taxes and refrain 
from private violence to settle disputes, and of a certain degree of mutual 
trust-confidence that others will, within limits, for the most part, also re-
spect the norms. The law without the custom supporting it doesn't work, 
because no legal system can maintain order against persistent and pervasive 
violations or evasions .... Yet custom also needs the support of the law[: 
the custom without the law doesn't work either, because n]orms of coop-
eration and mutual trust create openings for opportunists and free riders to 
abuse them, and outside of close-knit communities nonlegal social sanctions 
will not adequately police against such abuses 65 
In an observation that is obvious yet striking Francis Fukuyama notes that no 
one relies solely on contract; no one will contract with a person who threatens to 
cheat on and breach a contract whenever it benefits him to do so. 66 Indeed, 
contract law does not honor provisions eschewing the duty to act in good faith 
because no reasonable person would agree to such a term.67 
Trust reduces transaction costs: "there is less need to spell things out in lengthy 
contracts; less need to hedge against unexpected contingencies; fewer disputes, 
63. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 78-79 (describing grounding of business relationships in China 
on family connections). 
64. TRUDY GOVIER, SOCtAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 24 (1997) (stating that modem trust 
ties "more to people's sense of how institutions operate than to their attitudes towards unknown 
individuals"); id. at 29 ("To live in a complex society without going mad, we must have trust in systems 
too."). 
65. Robert W Gordon, Why Lawyers Can'tjust Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACfiCE: LAWYERS' ROLES, 
RESPONSlBILlTES, AND REGULATION 42, 44 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). Norms like trust "often precede 
laws but are then supported, maintained, and extended by laws." RoBERT AxELROD, THE COMPLEXlTY OF 
COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 60 (1997); see also Tamar 
Frankel, The Legal Infrastntcture of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property Law, 73 B.U. L. REv. 389, 
389-90 n.3 and accompanying text (1993) (arguing that markets require a legal infrastructure, or else 
they will fall into abuse and non-use). Many commentators now use the concept of "social capital," which 
has been defined as the "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them." ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvivAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 
(2000). Appreciation of the economic importance of culture, though, goes back at least to Max Weber. 
'Weber stood Karl Marx on his head by arguing that it was not underlying economic forces that created 
cultural products like religion and ideology but rather culture that produced certain forms of economic 
behavior." FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 43-44. Social capital strengthens supplier relations, regional 
production networks, and interfirm learning, thereby reducing transactions costs. Paul S. Adler 
& Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 3, 6, ll, 17 (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). 
66. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 25. 
67. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2000) (stating that the duty of good faith may be modified only by an 
agreement that is not "manifestly unreasonable"). 
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and less need to litigate if disputes arise."68 Conversely, "where trust is gone ... 
the agency costs incurred by the team members-the costs of mutual monitoring 
if you Will-are likely to increase."69 Rail freight contracts often include terms that 
are unenforceable under government regulations because the parties want "to 
reinforce shipper's 'moral commitment.' "70 Similarly, in enhanced customer-
supplier relationships, it is important to have "a set of ground rules that generates 
trustworthy transactions."71 
The importance of trust varies from contract to contract. Little trust is needed 
in sales of tangible goods whose worth can be gauged by immediate investigation. 
Such exchanges are common even among strangers in primitive cultures. Trust is 
more important when the value of the commodity exchanged is not so apparent. 
Thus "[o]penness is paramount in knowledge links."72 Such commodities are of 
growing economic importance. Trust is also important in bargains for future per-
formance, especially if one party will perform before receiving the agreed consid-
eration. Finally, trust is crucial in transactions so complex that the duties of each 
party cannot be fully spelled out. 73 
Trust can build over time. "[l]ndividuals begin cooperative exchange relation-
ships at low levels of exchange. As partners fulfill their exchange obligations, 
cooperation rises to higher levels."74 Transacting parties often follow "a 'tit-for-tat' 
strategy in which parties mimic the behavior of their counterparts. Under this 
strategy, initial cooperation is likely to induce cooperation by others."75 Similarly, 
Stewart Macaulay found that in on-going sales relationships "[d]isputes are fre-
quently settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanc-
tions."76 Not surprisingly, then, partners in strategic alliances are exhorted to "be-
gin with small trial efforts at collaboration" to see whether they are compatible.77 
Similarly, joint ventures work best for parties who contract repeatedly because. 
each wants to maintain the other's trust and thereby increase the likelihood of 
continued dealings. 78 
68. fVI<UYAMA, supra note 44, at 151; see Oliver E. Williamson, The Modem Corporation: Origins, 
Evolution, Attributes, 19]. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1545 (1981) ("Ubiquitous, albeit incomplete, 
contracting would ... be feasible if economic agents were completely trustworthy.") (emphasis added). 
69. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24]. CoRP. L. 869, 
870 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
70. Palay, supra note 28, at 276. 
71. Russell Johnston &: Paul R. Lawrence, Beyond Vertical Integration-The Rise of the Value-Adding 
Partnership, 88 HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1988, at 94,100. 
72. BADARAcco, supra note 16, at 142. 
73. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing complexity as a cause of incomplete 
contracts). 
74. See Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, l2].L. EcoN. &: ORG. 214, 
227 0996); David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and 1i11st, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 31, 44 (Diego Garnbetta ed., 1989). 
75. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 
19]. LEGAL STUD. 535, 537 n.9 (1990) (citing ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)). 
76. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 
55, 61 (Feb. 1963). 
77. BADARACCO, supra note 16, at 141. 
78. See Gerald T. Garvey, Why Reputation Favors joint Ventures over Vertical and Horizontal Integration: 
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Although trust and cooperation are mutually beneficial it is hard to contract 
for them. Parties may agree, say, to "cooperate fully,"79 but such terms are vague. 
Parties can be more specific and repeatedly revise their contract, but frequent 
revision is expensive; trust reduces costs by reducing the "need to spell things out 
in lengthy contracts. "80 Therefore, partners often do not amend the contract even 
as trust and cooperation increase. "Norms of cooperation and mutual trust create 
openings for opportunists ... to abuse them,"81 however, and the greater the trust, 
the more vulnerable the entrustor is to opportunism. 
Strategic alliances are particularly susceptible to opportunism. When Macaulay 
said business people often settle disputes "without reference to the contract or 
potential or actual legal sanctions[,]" he referred to people who repeatedly contract 
with each other in a tightly knit industry 82 In these circumstances one jeopardizes 
one's contractual relations and reputation by flouting industry norms, even if one 
complies with the literal terms of a written contract or might otherwise prevail in 
litigation. Some strategic alliances are formed in close-knit industries.83 In these 
cases courts should defer to industry norms. 
Most alliances are not between firms in close-knit industries, but courts should 
still supply them with gap-fillers and fiduciary duties. If courts enforce only literal 
contract terms, parties must draft expensive contracts covering every detail and 
contingency. Firms already in alliances will tend to be suspicious, to monitor their 
partners constantly, and to be grudging in their own performance because they 
can count on no .::nore in return. 
The possibility of growing trust complicates legal analysis. Courts interpreting 
a contract try to discern the intentions of the parties, but their intentions (and, 
accordingly, their duties) may evolve through their course of dealing. Parties can 
record revised intentions by amending their contract, but often they do not. Some 
changes of intent are evident and specific, but with trust and cooperation change 
is almost necessarily vague and amorphous. If courts ignore unrecorded changes 
of intent, the temptation of opportunism and the danger of relying on trust (rather 
than frequent, costly rewriting of contracts) both increase.84 "Without trust, there 
will be a strong incentive to bring ... activities in-house and restore the old 
hierarchy."85 Integration, however, is not always efficient.86 Thus, a lack of trust 
between contracting parties can diminish efficiency. 
A Simple Model, 28 ]. EcoN. BEHAV. & 0RG. 387, 391 (1995) (stating that "joint venture type arrange-
ments ... are more likely to be chosen when the relationship is repeated"). 
79. See GUTIERMAN, supra note 5, at 117.032 (discussing the sample contract term to "cooperate 
fully"). 
80. See HART, supra note 47, at 25 (discussing that contract renegotiation is costly). 
81. See Gordon, supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
82. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 61; see also Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 17, at 80 (discussing 
industries that feature "long-term, close relations with a limited number of independent suppliers that 
seem to mix elements of market and hierarchy"). 
83. See, e.g., Franchisors Form Special ADR Vehicle, ll ALTERNATIVES (Ctr. Pub. Res., New York, 
N.Y.), Mar. 1993, at 37, 42. 
84. Under the U.C.C. the "agreement" to be interpreted is defined not only from the parties' lan-
guage but also "by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade 
or course of performance." U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2000). 
85. FU!>-'UYAivlA, sttpra note 44, at 25. 
86. See mpra notes 16, 33 and accompanying text. 
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TRUST BETWEEN BUSINESS ENTITIES 
Trust is a human emotion that an organization cannot experience literally.87 
Members of one group, however, can form a consensus that members of another 
group are trustworthy and should be treated so as to preserve mutual trust.88 "[A] 
company may develop a character of sorts, in the form of those norms and ex-
pectations of its personnel that we call 'corporate culture.' ... [C]o"rporate culture 
is a commitment mechanism aimed at building a certain reputation .... "89 Parties 
to a transaction can build confidence by, for example, exchanging "hostages," like 
key personnel90 Such measures give a party confidence that the other will not 
torpedo the enterprise because it would incur serious costs if it did so. 
Corporate offices often change hands, though. 91 A new officer may not know 
of the relationship of trust with a partner. Even if she does know, a new officer 
may not feel bound by the informal commitments and understandings of her 
predecessors. If problems arise within the alliance, she may refuse to make con-
cessions reciprocating the other's past concessions because the latter benefitted 
the predecessor's career, not her own; and she may lack the personal camaraderie 
with the partner's officers that would reassure her that concessions by her will be 
reciprocated. Even if a side has given hostages, scuttling the alliance may be 
cheaper than maintaining it. 
Cooperation between partners can also be disrupted by the pursuit of sub-goals 
that is common among members of organizations. High officers on both sides 
may feel a sincere commitment to the alliance, but they cannot always make their 
subordinates cooperate, even if cooperation benefits the firm. For example, a 
firm's research and development director could withhold her best people from a 
joint venture because it is better for her own career to keep them herself. Risk-
averse managers may also prefer firm growth to maximization of firm value92 
When cooperation falters, partners dust off and read their contract, but they 
may have been careless, even deliberately so, in its drafting. Predicting how a 
court will fill the contract's gaps and construe fiduciary duties then becomes 
crucial in determining how the parties resolve their dispute. If courts demand 
high standards of fairness, sheer self-interest will deter each party from oppor-
tunism that could provoke judicial wrath. This prospect will bolster officers on 
each side who favor cooperation over opportunism.93 But if courts merely enforce 
87. See BADARACCO, supra note 16, at 141-42 (stating that the fundamental links in alliances are 
between groups of people, not between organizations). 
88. See id. at 141 (stating that a successful alliances needs "'champions' ... on both sides-that 
is, managers with appropriate skills who are personally committed to making the venture work"). 
89. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. REv. 523, 534-35 
(2001). 
90. See Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 519 (1983); Bryan Borys & David B. Jemison, Hybrid Arrangements as Strategic Alliances: Theo-
retical Issues in Organizational Combinations, 14 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 234, 243 (1989). 
91. See HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 364 ("The managers that built joint ventures did not continue 
to run them as their careers progressed."). 
92. See Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19]. LEGAL STUD. 
583, 590-91 (1990). 
93. See Borys & Jemison, supra note 90, at 238. 
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the letter of the contract, one party may withhold cooperation, even though so 
doing violates the unwritten understandings of those on both sides who struck 
the agreement but declined to specify their understanding fully in writing. 
THE GENERAL THEORY OF GAP FILLERS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Robert Scott says,"[t]he central task for the law of commercial contracts is to 
fill gaps in incomplete contracts."94 Douglas Baird adds,"the principal measure of 
the success of our contract law is whether it in fact induces cooperation."95 These 
claims seem surprising. Especially in contracts between merchants, why should 
the law not simply enforce the express terms and let the parties worry about any 
gaps therein? And why should the law seek to "induce cooperation" rather than 
letting market forces determine the proper level of cooperation? To advance the 
law of strategic alliances we need to understand not only whether Scott and Baird 
are right, but if so, why they are right. 
Some evidence suggests that the law of fiduciary duties and gap fillers does 
matter. john Coffee finds: "A paradigm shift is now underway in the manner in 
which financial economics views corporate governance, with the new scholarship 
emphasizing both the centrality of legal protections for minority shareholders and 
the possibility that regulation can outperform private contracting."96 Coffee fo-
cuses on public securities markets and legal protection of investors in public 
companies, but some of his analysis bears on strategic alliances. He notes the 
inevitable gaps in financial contracts and suggests the superiority of common law 
systems of corporate governance because "the common law encourages gap-
filling, while the civil law tends to impede it. ... The most important example 
for corporate law is the concept of fiduciary duty."97 Of course, market economies 
allow people broad freedom to pursue their self-interest. Making fiduciary duties 
too high could unduly restrict that pursuit. The goal then, is to strike the optimal 
balance between self-interest and the altruism demanded by fiduciary duties. 
The purpose of fiduciary duties is not to redistribute wealth from the rich and 
strong to the weak and poor. As Coffee shows, although people think business 
law leaves them vulnerable, they do not protect themselves with contractual 
safeguards; that would be too expensive.98 Rather they avoid harm by refusing 
to make equity investments. Accordingly, legal protection of business partici-
pants benefits not only them but business enterprises themselves, which are 
thereby enabled to raise equity capital that is not available in legal systems that 
deny such protection. 
94. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commerdal Contracts, 19]. LEGAL Sruo. 
597, 606 (1990). 
95. Baird, supra note 92, at 584. 
96. Coffee, supra note 4, at 2; see also Henry Hansmann&: Reinier Kraakman, The End of History 
for Corporate Law 10 Qan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Business Lawyer, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law) (finding the emergence in corporate law of an international "stan-
dard model" which includes as a "central tenet" that "minority or noncontrolling shareholders should 
receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders"). This model 
applies to close as well as public corporations. Id. at 1 L 
97. Coffee, sttpra note 4, at 27-28. 
98. See id. at 2-3. 
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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
AND GAP FILLERS 
Gap fillers and fiduciary duties are similar in many ways and the line between 
them is not bright. Both embody duties not drafted by the parties but imposed 
by law. Fiduciary duties may be seen as a subset of the broader category of gap 
fillers. 99 Fiduciary duties differ, though, from gap fillers that are merely technical, 
such as the attendance necessary for a quorum. "A fiduciary is a person who 
undertakes to act in the interest of another person."10° Fiduciary concepts evolved 
in English ecclesiastical and equity courts which applied religious and moral 
norms,101 and fiduciary doctrines still use moral concepts rarely employed for 
other gap fillers. 102 Many commentators, however, now eschew moral analysis of 
fiduciary law and view "the conflict of interest problem affecting fiduciaries [as] 
one of maximizing the efficiency gains from specialization and minimizing the 
transaction costs associated with defining and enforcing the duties of fiduciaries 
while limiting any resulting cheating by fiduciaries to an acceptable level. "103 
Breach of fiduciary duty often involves deception, so it is less likely to be 
detected than breaches of other duties. 104 For this reason courts treat breach of 
fiduciary duty more severely than mere breach of contract. 105 Fiduciaries are often 
better informed and more sophisticated than their beneficiaries, so contractual 
alteration of default rules is policed more closely by courts for fiduciary duties 
than for other gap fillers. 106 Even here, though, the distinction between fiduciary 
duties and other gap fillers is not sharp. In both cases courts tailor remedies to 
the facts of the case. As for waivers, under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
waivers of the fiduciary duty of loyalty are permitted "if not manifestly unreason-
able;"107 while contract terms are permitted to override the gap fillers of the Uni-
99. "The corporate fiduciary duty, according to the leading economic analysis of corporate law, is 
a principle that fills gaps in the 'corporate contract.'" Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Nann for Corporate 
Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L REv. 214, 216 (1999) (citing FRANK 
H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. F1SCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORFORATE LAW 90-93 (1991)). 
100. Austin W Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALL REv. 539, 540 (1949). 
101. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 7l CAL. L. REv. 795, 831 (1983) (footnote omitted). 
102. In Cardozo's famous words, the standard for fiduciaries is "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punc-
tilio of an honor the most sensitive." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
103. Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA 
L REv. 738, 758 (1978); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiducimy 
Duty, 36 ].L & EcoN. 425, 427 (1993) ("Acting on moral belief that agents ought to be selfless will 
not make principals better off; it will instead lead to fewer agents, or higher costs of hiring agents."). 
104. See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 78-79 Qohn W Pratt & Richard j. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
105. See Frankel, supra note 101, at 827-29. 
106. For example, Delaware General Corporation Law section 144 seems to permit a self-interested 
transaction between a corporation and its officers or directors without regard to fairness if the trans-
action is approved by disinterested directors. See DEL CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § l44(a)(l) (1991). Delaware 
courts, however, reject the plain meaning of section 144 and hold instead that "[c]ompliance with 
sectwn 144 merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the transaction was unfair." 
Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIVA.1ll34, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. june 23, 1997), reprinted in 23 
DEL.]. CORF. L 775, 796 (1998). 
107. UNIF. P'SH!P ACT (1994) § 103(b)(3)(i) (amended 1997), 6 U.LA. 44 (Supp. 2001). 
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form Commercial Code if the contract terms are not "unconscionable."108 If there 
is a difference between these two standards, it is slight. 
Courts and commentators widely agree that one function of contract law, es-
pecially in relational contracts and business associations, is to protect the "rea-
sonable expectations" of the parties. 109 In so doing, courts enhance trust. "Fidu-
ciary law provides far stronger incentives for people to enter relationships in which 
they are exposed to risks from the other parties."110 
Should courts fill gaps only when both parties intended a term but neglected 
to ·write it out, or should they impose duties which the obligor never intended to 
assume? The distinction has little practical significance. Especially among business 
people "[i]ntention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contem-
plation the reasonable and [the] probable."11 t Absent strong contrary evidence, it 
is reasonable and probable that the parties intended to maximize their wealth 
under the contract. 112 Applying this principle also benefits society generally. Ac-
cordingly, gap fillers and fiduciary duties may be discussed together, although it 
is occasionally desirable to specify under which rubric a judicially-supplied legal 
obligation is to be placed. 
Robert Hillman believes that for several reasons "fiduciary duties are largely 
ineffective in controlling opportunistic behavior by business partners."m In 
particular, the indeterminacy of fiduciary duties and the costs of litigation (in-
cluding damage to the business relationship) discourage suits over fiduciary du-
ties. Nonetheless, Hillman believes most business people observe an ethic broader 
than mere fear of legal penalties and that judge-made fiduciary duties significantly 
influence this ethic.tt4 He quotes Edward Rock saying that in corporate law judges 
function "more as preachers than as policemen."115 Hillman and Rock follow a 
growing trend to focus on the aspirational or expressive function of law in shaping 
social norms. 116 
Some scholars believe the law's preaching and policing functions are mutually 
exclusive.tt? It seems more likely, though, that they are mutually supportive: "The 
108. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2000). 
109. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissoltttion and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 2l0 0988) (noting the "increasing legislative and judicial tendency to define 
oppression by reference to the reasonable expectations of shareholders"). 
llO. Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting in Law 29 0999) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). Not all agree. See Robert E. 
Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 847, 851 & n.ll (2000) 
(arguing for a "new formalism" under which courts would "decline[ ] to fill any gaps at all [,]"but 
only "to enforce the ... express terms of the contract literalistically or 'as written'"); see generally 
Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 527 0999). 
1ll. jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889,891 (N.Y. 192l) (Cardozo,].). 
ll2. See Scott, supra note 94, at 602. 
1l3. Robert W Hillman, Bttsiness Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctline, 22 
CARDOZO L. REv. 51, 51 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
ll4. Id. at 72-73. 
ll5. Id. at 73 n.63, (quoting Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corp01·ate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1016 0997)). 
ll6. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27]. LEGAL Sruo. 585, 586 (1998); 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive FtmctionofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,2024-25 0996). 
ll7. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Tmst, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553 (2001); cf. infra notes 207-08 and accom-
panying text (enforcement of high fiduciary standards may encourage litigation which may undermine 
trust by conveying an impression that cheating is common). 
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trustworthiness of a party may be supported by direct assurances provided by 
third parties such as the government, [or] courts of law .... "118 
COMPETING THEORIES OF GAP FILLERS 
One approach to gap-filling is hypothetical bargain (or implicit contract) anal-
ysis, which involves "asking what contractual terms rational parties would have 
agreed to had they addressed ex ante the matter that falls into a contractual gap. 
For corporate contracts, the prevailing view is that this gap-filling principle should 
be 'maximize shareholder value."'ll 9 In non-corporate transactions this translates 
as maximize the wealth of the contracting parties. 120 
Courts maximize wealth by choosing gap-fillers that most parties want. m This 
reduces the costs of contracting because parties need not draft a term if they 
accept the law's default rule. Transaction costs are further reduced by favoring 
"default rules that are more expensive to write ex ante." 122 These include default 
rules requiring cooperation and good faith because it is harder to draft such 
requirements than to contract out of them. Business transactions generate positive 
externalities, including technological progress, increased employment and tax re-
ceipts, and enhanced competitiveness of American industry. Thus, by fashioning 
default rules that facilitate contracting, courts benefit not only contracting parties 
but society as a whole. 
One problem with this approach is that not everyone wants default rules that 
maximize total wealth. Although most people are risk-averse, 123 public investors 
can diversify their investments so that the performance of any single investment 
is insignificant. 124 Thus, investors can be risk-neutral about each investment. In-
vestors in non-public firms and those who invest their careers (or human capital)· 
in an enterprise, however, cannot diversify away their risk. 125 These types of in-
vestors include many owners of non-public firms in strategic alliances. 
To accommodate these investors, courts can fashion default rules "tailored" to 
the facts of each particular case. 126 Moreover, because the facts surrounding a 
relational transaction change over time, the default rules for that transaction could 
also change over time. For example, as trust and cooperation between the parties 
118. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 89, at 528. 
119. Smith, supra note 99, at 217 (foomote omitted). 
120. See id. 
121. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.j. 87, 89-90 (1989). 
122. Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1391, 1406 (1992). 
123. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 235-40 (5th ed. 1990) (stating 
that investors are risk-averse). 
124. See id. at 235 ("diversification is a sensible strategy for individuals who like to reduce their 
risks"). 
" 125. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 j.L. EcoN. & ORG. 267, 294 (1988) 
C I:Vlorkers generally cannot diversify their source of income by working for more than one firm at 
a time .... "). 
126. See id.; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 121 at 91. This is often done under the rubric "rational 
expectations of the parties." 
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grow, 127 the degree of loyalty and cooperation required by courts as a matter of 
fiduciary duties would also increase. Hypothetical bargain analysis is particularly 
complex during the performance phase, though, because the parties' relative 
bargaining strengths may shift as a result, for example, of sunk costs on one side. 128 
A hypothetical bargain would presumably forbid either party to take advantage 
of sunk costs when renegotiating a contract in order to prevent value-decreasing 
opportunism. Thus, courts must decide how the parties would have renegotiated 
their alliance pursuant to a hypothetical initial contract that forbids opportu-
nistic renegotiation. 
If maximizing the value of their project were the sole objective of strategic allies, 
courts would properly impose default rules requiring the highest degree ofloyalty 
and cooperation. Such rules would forbid, for example, termination of an alliance 
effected solely to acquire the assets of the alliance for less than fair value. 129 If, 
however, a party terminates because it has a more profitable alternative oppor-
tunity with a different partner, it is not clear that default rules should forbid the 
termination. Risk-neutral parties would not forbid termination if the total value 
of the alternative opportunity exceeded the total value of the existing undertaking. 
A party that is risk-averse, however, would demand compensation for any loss it 
suffers from termination by the other party Constructing such a complex hypo-
thetical bargain is a daunting judicial task. 
Accordingly, implicit contract analysis "is frequently indeterminate and there-
fore manipulable."uo This is especially true if courts ask not what most risk-
neutral parties would have agreed to, but what the specific parties (who may be 
risk-averse) would have agreed to or rationally expected. The problem is even 
greater if the default rules are not precise (or "crystal"), but are vague (or "muddy") 
standards-like "good faith" or "reasonable."131 Precise rules are easier for courts 
and parties to apply, 132 but precise rules lack the flexibility of vaguer standards, 
which can be molded to the context of the individual case. 133 
It is also claimed that "[b lasing legal rights on expectations is circular; the right 
must be specified first." 134 This is an exaggeration; people often expect certain 
behavior of others without believing they have a right to that behavior. Still the 
claim has an element of truth; to some extent people expect others to grant them 
what the law requires but not more. 135 
127. See supm notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
128. See infm notes 247-50 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of sunk costs on 
contracting). 
129. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 45 (Cal. 1961) (holding that if a partner dissolved "in bad 
faith ... by attempting to appropriate to his own use the new prosperity of the parmership without 
adequate compensation to his co-partner, the dissolution would be wrongful"). 
130. See Clark, sttpra note 104, at 68. 
131. See Ayres, supm note 122, at 1404-05 (discussing "crystal" and "muddy" default rules). 
132. See Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTER-
DISC. l.j. 1, 7 (1993). 
133. See Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structw·e, Legal Structure, and Defattlt Rttles: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. 
lNTERDlSC. l.j. 19, 27 (1993). 
134. Clark, supra note 104, at 78. 
135. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Qtw Bias and Contract Default Rtdes, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 608, 
625-26 (1998) (arguing that a "status quo bias" causes people to prefer the status quo, including 
contract default rules). 
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Costly litigation is more likely if parties cannot tell what default rules a court 
will impose. Therefore, "[t]he conventional assumption ... is that in ... com-
mercial environments it is more important for the law to be certain than to be 
right."136 Vague default rules disadvantage poorer and more risk-averse parties by 
encouraging litigation. 137 Scott advocates "[m]ajoritarian default rules ... [because 
they] expand contractors' choices by providing widely suitable preformulations, 
thus eliminating the cost (and the error) of negotiating every detail of the proposed 
agreement."138 This makes sense so long as preferring majoritarian default rules 
does not come at the expense of predictability. 
A competing theory of gap-fillers posits that a contracting par~ may deliber-
ately withhold information that would reduce its own return even if disclosure 
would increase the total joint value of the contract. 139 For this reason the law 
should sometimes impose "penalty" (or "information-forcing") defaults that "give 
at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule 
... in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to 
third parties (especially the courts)."140 Penalty defaults aid not only less-informed 
parties but also the courts. Ayres and Gertner opine: 
If it is costly for the courts to determine what the parties would have wanted, 
it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the parties to contract 
explicitly. In other words, penalty defaults are appropriate when it is cheaper 
for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex 
post what the parties would have wanted. Courts, which are publicly sub-
sidized, should give parties incentives to negotiate ex ante by penalizing them 
for inefficient gaps. 141 
Doing this would discourage recourse to the courts, which is costly to taxpayers. 
The better-informed party is also likely to be a repeat player-that is, one that 
enters into many similar transactions. Drafting contracts is cheaper for repeat 
players because the costs are spread over many contracts. Further, by penalizing 
a party who withholds information, penalty defaults enhance trust, which is cru-
cial to strategic alliances. 
This approach poses some problems, though. Especially in strategic alliances, 
many of which involve provision of technology by small firms, the larger party is 
not always better informed; each party may be better informed on certain issues. 
It is not even clear what "better informed" means. For example, should a court 
consider the sophistication of the parties' lawyers in determining which party is 
better informed? Uncertainty about which party a court will penalize would in-
136. Scott, supra note 94, at 598. 
137. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.]. 59, 78 (1993). 
138. Scott, supra note 94, at 607. 
139. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 121, at 94. 
140. !d. at 91; see also Scott, supra note 94, at 609 (using the term "information-forcing defaults"). 
141. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 121, at 93. 
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crease litigation. It could also be perverse to penalize a party for being better 
informed. In effect, penalty defaults reward parties for remaining ignorant and 
encourage them to pretend ignorance. 142 
Moreover, penalizing a party for failure to draft explicit contract terms thwarts 
the purpose of default rules to reduce the costs of contracting by providing parties 
a least-cost, off-the-rack set of contract terms. 143 True, Ayres and Gertner would 
use penalty defaults only "when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term 
ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have 
wanted." 144 Uncertainty about which those situations are, however, will increase 
litigation. Uncertainty would be especially frequent in contracts involving vague 
duties of performance (like "best efforts") and close cooperation over long periods 
of time; i.e., especially in strategic alliances. 
Finally, default rules are part of the status quo, which contracting parties tend 
to prefer. Therefore, choosing penalty default rules rather than the most efficient 
default rules may lead contracting parties to choose the less efficient rule. 145 Ac-
cordingly, courts should employ penalty defaults sparingly: 
INCOMPLETENESS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
INCOMPLETENESS IN BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
A naif might assume that business people spell out all their contract duties. 
Not so. The volume of intercorporate litigation alone shows the incompleteness 
of business contracts, since serious disputes do not arise if contracts are fully 
specified. 146 Still, it is striking how incomplete business contracts often are: "many, 
if not most, ... reflect no planning, or only a minimal amount of it, especially 
concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective performances."147 There are 
exceptions: "Exchanges are carefully planned when it is thought that planning 
and a potential legal sanction will have more advantages than disadvantages."146 
A factor favoring specificity is "complexity of the agreed performance over a long 
petiod [of time]. Another factor is whether or not the degree of injury in case 
142. See Gillette, supra note 75, at 576-81 (1990) (arguing against rewarding willful or negligent 
ignorance). 
143. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
144. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 121, at 93. 
145. See Korobkin, supra note 135, at 668. 
146. One study found that intercorporate litigation in the auto industry actually grew from the 
early 1970s until the late 1980s. See generally Lane Kenworth et al., "The More Things Change. "· 
Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile Industry, 21 U\w & Soc. INQUIRY 631 
(1996). Moreover, although it found that litigation seems to have declined since then, the reason for 
the decline is greater resort to alternative dispute resolution, not a reduction of disagreements resulting 
from greater contract specificity. Id. at 675-76. 
147. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 60; see Holmstrom & Roberts, supra note 17, at 81 ("[C]ontracts 
between the Japanese automakers and their suppliers are short and remarkably imprecise, essentially 
committing the parties only to work together to resolve difficulties as they emerge. Indeed, they do 
not even specify prices, which instead are renegotiated on a regular basis."). 
148. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 65. 
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of default is thought to be potentially great."149 These factors are common to 
strategic alliances. 
WHY ARE CONTRACTS INCOMPLETE? 
Even if complete contracts are possible in theory, parties do not even try to 
create them: "[a]ll contracts have gaps."150 The main reason for gaps is that ne-
gotiating and drafting contracts is expensive. If a contingency is unlikely to occur 
or to be very important if it does occur, the cost of drafting a term to cover that 
contingency may exceed the benefits of adding the term151 This problem is es-
pecially severe for strategic alliances. Due to the length and complexity of the 
contemplated relationship, the contingencies are much more numerous than in, 
for example, a one-shot sale of goods. 152 
The cost of drafting a precise term may be warranted if it will be used in many 
transactions. 153 Even if the parties are not repeat players, their lawyers may be. In 
corporate acquisitions, for example, "the general contents of the agreement have 
by now become pretty much standardized."154 This occurred because lawyers who 
specialize in acquisitions developed standard terms. The drafting of strategic al-
liance contracts is less concentrated in a group of specialists, though, and alliances 
149. Id. Macaulay studied sales contracts in which "there ... [was] little room for ... difference 
of opinion about the nature and quality of a seller's performance." Id. at 62. There is even less room 
for dispute about a buyer's obligations. In strategic alliances, though, the duties of both partners are 
usually more complex and, therefore, more subject to dispute. 
Further, in the transactions Macaulay studied "[w]hen defaults occur[red] they [were] not likely to 
be disastrous because of techniques of risk avoidance or risk spreading." I d. at 63. These included 
maintaining relations with several suppliers or customers so that if one of them caused trouble, the 
victim could switch to another. ld. The very threat of switching encourages cooperation and deters 
opportunism. In strategic alliances, though, it is usually impossible to keep a reserve of alternative 
partners in case one's current partner misbehaves. 
150. Smith, supra note 99, at 234; see also Or. RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Or. L.P., 
840 E Supp. 770, 776 (D. Or. 1993), aff'd, 76 E3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that a very 
detailed contract would be extremely long but still contain "loopholes"); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral 
Hazards in Team.s, 13 BELL]. ECON. 324, 325 (1982) (declaring it impossible to write a contract with 
optimal incentives when performance is hard to monitor). But see Sharon Gifford, Limited Attention 
and the Optimal Incompleteness of Contracts, 15 ].L. EcoN. & 0RG. 468, 470 (1999) (claiming that 
complete contracts are theoretically possible but that parties choose not to create them). 
151. See Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A 
Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv. 189, 228-29 (1995). 
152. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal 
Rules, 101 YALE L.]. 729, 730-31 (1992) (stating that every long-term relational contract is "insuffi-
Ciently state contingent"). 
153. "If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs of designing rules-which are borne once-
are likely to be exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is applied." Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992). If certain transactions are 
common in an industry, an industry trade group may promulgate standard terms that parties to these 
transactions can adopt. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996). Such conditions do not 
exist for most strategic alliances. 
154. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset P1icing, 94 YALE L.]. 239, 257 
(1984). 
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are more varied and changing more rapidly than are acquisitions, so the evolution 
of standard terms is more primitive. 155 
Strategic alliances are not repeat transactions-at least not for both parties. A 
company with many franchises can spread the costs of drafting a detailed standard 
franchise contract across many agreements. It can also claim it needs uniform 
agreements in order to resist requests by a franchisee for different terms. There 
are fewer gaps for courts to fill in such cases. Because of the franchisor's greater 
knowledge and sophistication, however, judicially created fiduciary principles 
may often be needed in such cases to prevent unfairness. 
The use of fiduciary duties is not a zero-sum game in which one party's gain 
equals the other's loss. For example, a franchisor will want to attract the best fran-
chisees by promising to treat them fairly. If potential franchisees are unsophisticated, 
though, they may be unable to distinguish "fair" from "unfair" franchisors. Robust 
fiduciary standards then, not only protect franchisees, but also benefit "fair" fran-
chisors by enhancing their trustworthiness among potential franchisees. 156 
Further, in strategic alliances performances are unusually hard to define, moni-
tor, and measure. 157 Indeed, this is a major reason for creating alliances. Suppose, 
for example, one party agrees to improve a product or to create a new one for a 
price. If the contract defines a standard to be achieved and sets it too low, the 
party has no incentive to exceed the standard, even if the value of a better product 
might exceed its development costs. If the standard is set too high, the party will 
reject the contract. Therefore, the best contract solution may be to require the 
party to use its "best efforts." Such terms (including "reasonable" and "good faith") 
are often used to define duties in strategic alliances. 158 These terms are so vague, 
though, that the parties may omit them because they do not sound "legal." 
Parties may leave contracts incomplete to preserve flexibility. 159 That is, if a 
contingency is hard to anticipate and deal with in advance, the parties may leave 
it to be resolved later. 160 In particular, they may not initially know what to expect 
of each other. 161 Further, in long-term contracts parties often tacitly agree to 
amend their bargain if unexpected conditions arise. 162 Although this behavior is 
understandable, leaving issues open and relying on future adjustments invite mis-
understandings and opportunism. The parties may honestly disagree when they 
155. See Glover, supm note 1, at 9 (referring to a lack of standard-form contracts for joint ventures). 
156. See generally supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing significance of trust in 
strategic alliances). 
157. See Klein&: Murphy, sttpra note 37, at 267-68 (stating that a fully specified contract may be 
impractical because "performance may be prohibitively costly to measure and to specify in a way that 
contractual breach and the extent of damages can be proven to the satisfaction of the court"). 
158. See GUTIERMAN, supra note 5, at 117.032 (sample provision that each party "agrees to co-
operate fully with the other"); see also Charles ]. Goetz &: Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, llll-30 (1981). 
159. See Gifford, supra note 150, at 469. 
160. See LoRANGE &: Roos, supra note 28, at 268-69. 
161. See BADARACCO, supra note 16, at 99. 
162. See Palay, sttpra note 28, at 279-85 (noting that in the rail freight industry parties were 
expected to be, and generally were, open to adjustments of contract terms). 
Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances 79 
later (re)negotiate, or one party may use a strategic advantage at that time to 
demand unfair terms. 
Similarly, parties may leave contracts incomplete because they rely on termi-
nation of the contract to escape from an unacceptable situation. 163 Fear of ter-
mination may then encourage both parties to be reasonable. Indeed parties some-
times eschew formal contracts to make the weapon of termination easier to use. 164 
But this, can also backfire-a party may use termination as an offensive rather 
than a defensive weapon. 165 
Contracting for alliances is further complicated by the need to specify gover-
nance mechanisms. Economists often classify contracts as involving markets or 
hierarchies] 66 Parties to market transactions remain independent except for the 
duties that the contract stipulates. Some tasks are too complex to be spelled out 
in advance. For example, an employer cannot fully specify the employee's duties 
in advance but needs discretion to direct the employee as need arises. In such 
cases the parties agree to a hierarchy: one party (e.g., the employee) submits to 
the control of the other (e.g., the employer). 
Alliances are not market transactions because the parties' duties are not fully 
specified. Neither are they hierarchies, because control is usually shared rather 
than assigned to one party. Shared control complicates drafting. One study found: 
"It was often necessary to spell out responsibilities carefully and to keep the lines 
of authority clear in order for a joint venture to succeed. Otherwise, squabbles 
ensued."167 If one party gets general control, the other may demand a veto in 
certain circumstances, which then must be defined. 168 The junior partner may 
also (or instead) obtain a buyout provision so it can exit if it feels the senior 
partner is being unfair. 169 If parties will share control equally, then they will prob-
ably want a deadlock breaking device such as a neutral director unaffiliated with 
either party and acceptable to both, or an arbitration clauseY0 
163. See Johnston & Lawrence, supra note 71, at 100-0l. 
164. "(A] number of alliances do not use a contract in the traditional sense of the word." TIM 
UNDERHILL, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: MANAGING THE SUPPLY CHAIN 98 (1996). A letter of intent may be 
used instead of or in addition to a formal contract. See also id. at 99; Bernstein, supra note 151, at 
227-29 (the costs of enforcing a contract may be so high that the parties prefer to forego a formal 
contract). 
165. See Hamel et al., supra note 23, at 137. 
166. This is indicated by the very title of Oliver E. Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies. 
167. HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 369. 
168. See Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a joint Venture, 
39 HAsTINGS L.j. 63, 70 (1987) (minority partner in joint venture usually has some veto). 
169. See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (describing buyout provisions). 
170. Neutral directors are common in venture capital investments. See Steven Kaplan & Per Strom-
berg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital 
Contracts 17 (Mar. 2000) available at http://papers.ssm.com/papertaf?abstract_id = 218175 (unpub-
lished manuscript) (in venture capital investments surveyed outsiders held over twenty percent of 
board seats and neither investors nor founders held a majority in sixty-two percent). Although venture 
capital investments are not strategic alliances, the two have several similarities. The example of venture 
capnal shows the eagerness of parties to relational contracts to have a private third party to resolve 
differences rather than giving one party control or suffering deadlocks. 
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Another complication in many strategic alliances is the need to cover future 
financing. For example, if a joint venture develops a valuable product, it may 
then need more money to manufacture and market the product. In drafting the 
initial contract, the parties may anticipate that one or both of them will be unable 
to provide its share of future financing. In such cases the parties need provisions 
for raising future capital. Such terms are rarely needed in other kinds of contracts. 
Negotiations are further tangled for the many alliances among more than two 
parties. "[R] unning a triparty joint venture was extremely difficult, especially with 
respect to ... direction and control."171 As the number of parties increases, the 
number of pairs of parties that must reach agreement grows geometrically, not 
arithmetically, making contracting more difficult. 
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND THE ROLE OF TRUST 
In strategic alliances success depends heavily on trust and cooperation. "Busi-
nessmen often prefer to rely on 'a man's word .... "'172 
In addition to being based on a viable business idea, and a realistic overall 
strategy, a strategic alliance must be based on mutual cooperation among the 
parties involved. This is the sine qtta non for strategic alliances. We need to 
create a climate of trust and mutual understanding of why all partners enter 
the alliance in the first place. 173 
Trust often grows. 174 As it does, "mechanisms of social control, as opposed to 
formal contract ... become increasingly important as the relationships between 
firms develop over time."l75 
Because duties in alliances can be defined only vaguely, l76 the level of a party's 
cooperation depends largely on how much it trusts the other.t77 Hard bargaining 
erodes trust, though, by signalling others that one will do no more than is ex-
pressly required: "parties propose simple contracts ... in order to signal that they 
are trustworthy."t 78 As Macaulay found, "[s]ome businessmen object that in ... a 
carefully worked out relationship, one gets performance only to the letter of the 
171. HARRlGAN, sttpra note 13, at 368; see aLso Gulati, supra note 5, at 96 ("[M]ultilateral alliances 
pose larger organizational problems."). 
172. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 58. 
173. LORANCE & Roos, sttpra note 28, at 19; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 341-42 (men-
tioning strategic alliances as depending on trust). 
174. See LORANCE & Roos, Sttpra note 28, at 79. 
175. Gulati, sHpra note 5, at 94. Thus, when two parties enter repeated alliances, in later transac-
tions they often "don't bother to write detailed contracts." Id. at 95 (quoting one firm manager). 
176. See sttpra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. 
177. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of trust in strategic 
alliances). 
178. Eggleston et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 22); see jORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: 
HOW COMPANlES BUlLD MUTUAL TRUST AND WtN ToGETHER 263-64 (1999) (joint ventures involving 
large companies often use simple, incomplete contracts); see aLso Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley 
Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 249-50 (1995) (stating that hard bargaining 
may hinder good relations between joint venture partners); David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Com-
mercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REv. 373, 405 (1990) (same). 
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contract. ... whereas performing to the spirit of the contract would offer mutual 
expected gains. "179 Literal compliance with a contract may violate the other party's 
reasonable expectations. 180 This phenomenon is not limited to business dealings: 
"People who distrust the motives of others tend to have more rigid and narrow 
expectations and to provoke the very reactions they fear." 181 It is no surprise, 
then, one study found that many business "managers found the act of writing 
contracts unpleasant."182 
This attitude affects the decisions of business people about when and how 
lawyers should enter negotiations. One study found: 
The most frequent answer explaining why announced joint ventures never 
went beyond the discussion stage was that ventures were sunk by lawyers. 
This explanation suggests that managers were homogeneous in their out-
looks; lawyers were too adversarial. A more likely explanation for joint-
venture deaths at the contract-writing stage was that partners did not think 
through their arrangements adequately before they reached the altar. The 
probing questions the lawyers asked exposed these shortfalls in partners' 
agreements, and the venture fell apart. 183 
Stewart Macaulay quotes one business lawyer, "businessmen when bargaining 
often talk only in pleasant generalities, think they have a contract, but fail to 
reach agreement on any of the hard, unpleasant questions until forced to do so 
by a lawyer."184 
If disputes arise, though, a party may rue having heavily relied on trust. "Many 
managers ... suggested that the only time they consulted their contracts was 
when their joint ventures failed. (Then they hoped that their lawyers had written 
a good divorce settlement for them.)"185 "One [lawyer] stated that he was 'sick of 
being told, "We can trust old Max," when the problem is not one of honesty but 
one of reaching an agreement that both sides understand.' "186 
Since they dislike lawyers, business people often exclude them from initial 
negotiations, agree on main terms between themselves, and bring in their lawyers 
179. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 64; see also Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural 
Consequences of Markets and Other Economic· Institutions, 36]. EcoN. LIT. 75, 95 (1998) (cooperation 
is more likely if parties consider a contract incomplete). 
180. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiducimy Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Finns, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 537, 583 & n.246, 584 (1997). 
181. John G. Holmes & John K. Rempel, Ii1.1st in Close Relationships, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 187, 
190 (Clyde Hendrtck ed., 1989); see also GOVIER, supra note 64, at 38 (trust and mistrust perpetuate 
and feed on themselves). 
182. HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 363. 
183. /d.; see also David Ernst & Steven I. Glover, Strategic Alliances, INSIGHTS (Aspen Law & Bus_), 
Oct. 1997, at 6 (in negotiating strategic alliances, the instincts of lawyers to minimize Iisk clashed 
wnh the instincts of business people to take Iisk); Glover, supra note l, at 3 (lawyers' inclinations 
may clash with the desire of partners "to establish a long-term cooperative relationship"). 
184. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 59. 
185. HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 363; see also Johnston & Lawrence, supra note 71, at 101 (to 
have a successful alliance parties "must be able to punish partners for acts of opportunism and 
gaming"). 
186. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 58-59. 
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only at the last possible moment to put the agreement in "legal language."187 
Whatever the wisdom of this practice, it helps explain the incompleteness of 
business contracts. The business people on one or both sides may not realize the 
gaps or possibilities for opportunism in their agreed terms until the lawyers appear 
late in the negotiating game. At that point the business people may fear that they 
would look foolish and unreasonable if they tried to renegotiate points already 
agreed upon. 188 Instead they must hope that a court will fill the gaps and deploy 
fiduciary duties to curb opportunism. 
Reliance on trust poses further risks in strategic alliances. First, they are major 
transactions; problems can be more costly than in the typical sale of goods. Sec-
ond, they are not repeat transactions. "The mere anticipation of mutually reward-
ing future transactions maintains the cooperative equilibrium" in on-going supply 
relationships. 189 Third, trust and cooperation are less important where there is "a 
thick market for substitute performance .... Well-developed markets eliminate 
much of the need for legally mandated mutual cooperation because parties trading 
in these markets can often make optimal adjustments unilaterally by, for example, 
purchasing the necessary adaptation from the lowest bidder on the open mar-
ket."190 But, "[a]s specialization increases, each party becomes more vulnerable to 
strategic demands by the other. "191 This vulnerability and the corresponding need 
for trust is high in most strategic alliances. ' 
One factor in trust is reputation. Business people seek partners with good 
reputations because they usually have good character and behave fairly so as to 
maintain their reputations. 192 This reliance reduces what can be considerable 
search costs of finding a trustworthy partner. 193 It also obviates detailed contracts: 
"trust and nonlegal sanctions encourage the formation of simple contracts. "194 
Reliance on reputation, however, can backfire. 195 It does not preclude litigation. 
Third parties usually cannot tell who is lying or misbehaving in a business dispute, 
187. See Kenneth R. Margolis, The COSE Study: A Report on Small Business Client Satisfaction 
with the Delivery of Legal Services 20 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Business 
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) (nearly eighty percent of business people surveyed 
brought their lawyers into business transactions only after most details were settled, or when it was 
absolutely necessary to do so, or never). 
188. They could also incur legal liability if they already had sufficient agreement to create a contract 
or if their statements had led the other party to incur costs in reliance thereon, thereby giving rise to 
pre-contractual liability. See E. Allen Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: 
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLVM. L. REv. 217 (1987). 
189. Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005, 2048 
(1987}; see also Holmstrom &:. Roberts, mpra note 17, at 81 (between Japanese automakers and 
suppliers short, imprecise contracts were adequate because of "the long-term, repeated nature of the 
interaction"). 
190. Scott, supra note 94, at 612; see also Macaulay, supra note 76, at 58, 63, 66 (contracting is 
short when substitutes are available). 
19l. Scott, supra note 94, at 612. 
192. See Chamy, supra note 178, at 393-95. 
193. See Gulati, supra note 5, at 107 ("Firms ... can significantly reduce their search for a new 
partner when they decide to ally with an entity they already trust .... "). 
194. Eggleston et al., mpra note 24 (manuscript at 23); see also Antony W Ones, A Case-Study 
Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22]. LEGAL Sruo. 367, 373, 377-80 (1993) (franchisors have a 
contractual right to abscond with "hostages" but rarely do so because of their concern for their rep-
utations). 
195. See Gillette, supra note 75, at 537 (indicating that parties with a good reputation sometimes 
behave unfairly). 
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so they may blame both parties equally To preserve its reputation, then, an in-
nocent party may feel as much pressure as the guilty party to end the dispute by 
making concessions; or even more pressure if reputation is more important to the 
innocent than to the guilty party In such cases a judicial decision can resolve not 
only the legal dispute but also the reputational issue by declaring which party is 
innocent and which is guilty This function is not unique to business disputes but 
is part of the general legitimizing function of adjudication. 
To do this, however, courts must apply the same principles that business people 
weigh in determining reputation. If a court simply enforces the letter of the con-
tract and disregards principles of fairness, its judgment may even mislead third 
parties by, for example, appearing to vindicate a party who has flouted the busi-
ness community's notions of fairness. 
COURSE OF DEALING 
The course of dealing between parties may show how close a relationship they 
intend, and their intentions may change over time. Deciding how a course of 
dealing should affect fiduciary duties is often difficult, though, because ordinarily 
the parties say nothing explicitly about changing their legal duties. The parties 
may honestly disagree about the level of trust and cooperation that they intend 
at any particular time. Moreover, the very concept of intent is problematic for 
fictitious legal persons like business entities. 
Courts should enforce reasonable expectations even if this imposes on a party 
greater obligations than it intended to assume. A party should be bound by rea-
sonable expectations that its conduct has induced in the other party; even if the 
inducement was accidental, unintended. As between the two parties, the one 
whose understanding is more reasonable should prevail. Anyone who fears being 
bound by the other's mistaken (but reasonable) misapprehension can protect itself 
by expressly informing the other of its intentions. By protecting reasonable ex-
pectations, courts foster trust and cooperation. The alternative of ignoring 
reasonable but unilateral expectations creates a trap for the trusting and unwary 
and forces prudent parties to demand repeated, detailed revision of the explicit 
contracts. That would be inefficient and detrimental to business and to society 
at large. 
RISK 
In general courts should act to maximize the joint wealth of the parties because 
that is probably what they want. This view assumes the parties are risk-neutral. 195 
Some firms are risk-averse, often because managers Oike most people) are risk-
averse even if their shareholders want the firm to be risk-neutral because they 
196. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. 
L REv. 851, 867 (1981) (defending the presumption of risk-neutrality). The presumption should be 
especially strong where the parties have agreed to cooperate, to use best efforts, or to act on good 
faith. Though vague, all these phrases connote each party's willingness to strive for mutual benefit 
rather than to be narrowly selfish. See Gillette, supra note 75, at 540. 
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have diversified portfolios. 197 But other parties are risk-preferers. 198 Therefore, 
courts should assume risk-neutrality unless the parties have evinced a different 
intent. This is not only the statistically most reasonable assumption but also best 
for society because it maximizes total wealth. 
Of course, parties may disagree about risk, even when both are risk-neutral, if 
they bear risks of an undertaking unequally. If, for example, one joint venturer 
contributes a patent while the other finances research to develop the patented 
device and they share profits equally, the latter will want higher potential profits 
to justify further research and development costs. lt is proper for a court to weigh 
this in ascertaining the parties' reasonable expectations. 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT COMPLETENESS IN 5TRA TEGIC 
ALLIANCE CONTRACTS 
Courts may mistakenly assume that strategic alliance contracts are complete. 
First, the allies are usually large firms and sophisticated-unlike, say, consumers, 
who may not understand unfair contracts. Second, strategic alliances are major 
transactions which might be expected to be carefully negotiated-unlike routine, 
minor transactions to which parties often give little thought. Third, strategic al-
liance contracts are usually long and complicated. For these reasons a court may 
presume that the contract is fair and complete so that the court need not fill 
alleged gaps or impose fiduciary duties. 
That presumption is inappropriate. Even a company sophisticated in some field 
of business may lack experience with strategic alliances. Since there is not (or, at 
least, not yet) a specialized bar for strategic alliances, and because many parties 
to alliances are fledgling, cash-starved firms, their lawyers may also know little 
about alliances. 199 Thus, even contracts between merchants may have large gaps 
and unconscionable terms200 
Because performances are hard to define and to monitor in a strategic alliance 
and one or both parties lack critical information, even a long, complex contract 
heavily negotiated between sophisticated parties will have major gaps.201 Despite 
their sophistication-or rather because of it-parties will not spend more nego-
tiating a contract term than the term would be worth. Moreover, as noted, hard 
bargaining can erode the mutual trust needed for a successful alliance. 202 Again, 
197. See id. at 554-56 (opining that some firms are risk-averse). 
198. See id. at 557-60. 
199. Bernstein, supra note 178, at 252, says lawyers often educate unsophisticated entrepreneurs 
in venture capital financings. This is not always true, especially in smaller financings. Similarly, in 
strategic alliances, especially smaller ones, at least one side may lack sophisticated counsel because it 
wants to limit its expenses and because using sophisticated counsel may erode the trust and cooper-
ation that the parties want to foster. Business people also tend to minimize the lawyers' role in ne-
gotiations, which limits the lawyers' ability to educate their clients and suggests that business people 
may not heed their lawyers much, anyway. See supra text accompanying note 185. 
200. See, e.g., Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W2d 760, 762-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding a termination clause unconscionable in contract between merchants). 
201. "[C]omplexity in a contract is often an appropriate response to asymmetry of information and 
monitoring difficulties." Eggleston et al., supra note 24 (manuscript at 13). 
202. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
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"many, if not most, [business] exchanges reflect no planning, or only a minimal 
amount of it, especially concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective 
performances."203 Accordingly, the parties may count on courts to demand fair 
conduct in ways that their agreement does not specify. 204 
GAP FILLERS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES205 
EXTERNALITIES FROM ADJUDICATION 
Adjudication generates positive externalities. Business disputes are common 
but few of them wind up in court. The disputants bargain in the shadow of the 
law; they try to predict what a court will do if they resort to litigation. Reported 
court decisions promote settlements by giving them guidance,206 so it is important 
how courts handle gap fillers and fiduciary duties in strategic alliances. If courts 
choose bad default rules, contracting parties must either accept those bad rules 
or incur the cost of drafting around them. 
Blair and Stout posit negative externalities from frequent fiduciary duty suits: 
suits cause "the increase in opportunistic behavior that results from suggesting 
that breach of duty is common, even normal, in business relationships."207 Blair 
and Stout advise courts to declare high fiduciary standards but not to enforce 
them through liability.208 
This is a crucial claim-and it seems gravely wrong. It suggests that the ideal 
level of litigation over fiduciary duties is zero because that would signal that no 
fiduciary ever violates its duties. More likely, though, it would breed cynicism as 
both fiduciaries and beneficiaries realized that fiduciary duties are empty prom-
203. Macaulay, supra note 76, at 60. 
204. See supra text following notes 188 and 195 and accompanying text. 
205. Professor Ribstein proposes laws recognizing a new form of business organization-the "con-
tractual entity"-in which "the parties have no duties to each other except as provided in their agree-
ment." Ribstein, supra note 3, at 435, 437. Although this article advocates strong fiduciary duties, the 
two proposals are not necessarily inconsistent. First, Professor Ribstein's category of "contractual en-
tity" excludes the many alliances that fall under another category of business associations. Most joint 
ventures, for example, are either incorporated or treated as partnerships. Second, Professor Ribstein's 
proposed default rule of no fiduciary duties applies only to an alliance that registers as a "contractual 
entity" and so voluntarily chooses this rule. Id. Third, Professor Ribstein would enforce duties the 
parties "provided in their agreement" as well as the "good faith duties of the sort that are implicit in 
contracts generally."Jd. at 437. This leaves some room for gap-filling and imposing fiduciary duties. 
206. See jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 
1565-66 (1989). Other factors also influence settlements, including calculations of whether the parties 
can sustain a long, expensive court battle and how litigation will affect their reputations . 
. 207. Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 73 (footnote omitted). They also argue that frequent suits 
diScourage trust by signaling that a relationship is "competitive and untrusting, rather than cooperative 
and. trusting" and that the two sides are not "members of a common 'ingroup.'" This would reduce 
W!lhngness to look after the other party's interests. Id. at 73 n.173. 
208. See id. at 8, 38 n.73, 71; see also his Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract 
Enforcement, Trust and Crowding 4, 14, 27 (2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/paper. 
taf?abstract_id = 240389 (unpublished manuscript) argues that "medium" enforcement of contracts is 
undesirable because it "crowds out" trust. The assumptions of their model and laboratory experiment, 
however, seem so removed from the reality of strategic alliances as to be irrelevant to them. 
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ises209 judges would be viewed as hypocrites who say one thing but do another. 
Certainly it is not accepted in other areas of the law that suits to rectify wrongdoing 
actually encourage it by publicizing its existence. Legal systems that impose higher 
fiduciary duties get better behavior.210 This claim by Blair and Stout even clashes 
with their own assertion that "trust is easier to destroy than to create. "m 
Further, Blair and Stout implicitly deny the importance of reputation. Concern 
for one's reputation depends on the expectation that good or bad behavior will 
be publicized. To Blair and Stout though, publicity about misconduct backfires 
by precipitating more of it. This contradicts the axiom epitomized in Brandeis's 
adage, "[S]unlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the best policeman."212 
Accordingly, Blair and Stout's theory of a negative externality from fiduciary duty 
suits should be rejected. 
SHOULD GAP FILLERS BE THE SAME FOR ALL FORMS 
OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES? 
The legal differences among the many forms of alliances are numerous and 
mostly esoteric. Often parties think little about the choice of form, so perhaps the 
law should assign default rules and fiduciary duties for alliances with close atten-
tion to the facts of the specific case but with little regard for the form of entity. 
Both case law and commentary offer support for this approach. Courts have edged 
away from the tradition that fiduciary duties are higher in partnerships than in 
corporations. The emerging view is that fiduciary duties should be higher in 
smaller entities-including both partnerships and close corporations-than 
in larger entities-mostly public corporations. 213 
Courts have also labored to narrow the differences in the statutory default rules 
for various business entities. For example, a partnership (including a joint ven-
ture) at will can be dissolved without statutory penalty by any member at any 
time, but in most states a corporation can be dissolved only by a majority of the 
board, or shareholders, or both.214 In partnership law, courts have invoked fidu-
209. Imposition of legal sanctions for some behavior inclines people to desist from and condemn 
that behavior; lack of sanctions has the contrary effect. See Dan M. Kahan, Tmst, Collective Action, and 
Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333, 345 (2001); see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (stating that 
norms of trust and cooperation require the law's support). 
210. See Rafael LaPorta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Govemance, 58]. FIN. EcoN. 3, 9 
(2000) (common law systems, which impose higher fiduciary duties, lead to higher fiduciary conduct 
and greater willingness of investors to commit money to corporate fiduciaries). 
21l. Blair&: Stout, supra note 26, at 47. 
212. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914). 
213. See, e.g., Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (using a standardized 
fiduciary duty but advocating case-by-case tailoring of standards); Toner v. Salt. Envelope Co., 498 
A.2d 642, 650 (Md. 1985) (using a standardized fiduciary duty but advocating case-by case tailoring 
standards); see also EASTERBROOK&: FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 244 (citing Michaels with approval and 
noting versatility of such an approach). 
214. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 14.02 (1999) (requiring board resolution and shareholder ap-
proval for dissolution). 
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ciary duties to limit opportunistic dissolutions, 215 while in corporations they have 
ordered dissolution to rescue oppressed minority shareholders.216 
Nonetheless, different entities should not be treated identically. The respect due 
to legislatures counsels against disregarding statutory differences. Also, though 
little thought is given to the choice of entity in some alliances, in others it receives 
much thought. Courts should take care not to frustrate rule choices intended by 
the parties. The question of how much weight to give the choice of entity when 
filling gaps is often difficult because gaps occur only when parties do not specify 
what they want. Courts can often infer the parties' intentions from the facts of a 
case, however. How precise and confident the inference is will vary from case to 
case. Sometimes, for example, there is abundant evidence of a desire for a high 
degree of trust and cooperation; in others there is a dearth of such evidence. 
HIGH OR LOW FIDUCIARY DUTIES? 
Before discussing specific issues, it is appropriate to ask whether fiduciary du-
ties in strategic alliances should generally be high or low. Although fiduciary duties 
should not be so high as to make alliances unprofitable for either party and 
thereby discourage the creation of alliances, they should be high enough to deter 
behavior that increases one party's profit but imposes on the other an even greater 
loss so that the total value of the deal is reduced. 
Eric Talley argues that high fiduciary duties induce excessive monitoring by 
parties seeking profit by finding breaches by the other party.217 This concern seems 
overblown, at least in the context of strategic alliances. Talley envisions individual 
parties who reduce their work for the entity in order to increase their monitoring 
of others.218 This is not true of alliances between firms, which can assign agents 
to monitor their partners without reducing their work for the alliance. Also, as 
Talley recognizes, considerations are different when a party is a repeat player 
concerned about its reputation. 219 Many parties to alliances are (or hope to be) 
repeat players. 
Others argue along similar lines that high fiduciary duties must be vague and 
therefore will encourage expensive, divisive litigation rather than "resolving prob-
lems cooperatively."220 This is also dubious. By promoting trust and cooperation, 
high fiduciary duties encourage parties to work out disputes amicably and dis-
courage strategic behavior that spawns disagreements. 
215. See supra note 129. 
216. See fRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw§ 5.1.2(c), at 471-75 (2000). 
217. See Eric Talley, Taking the "I" aut of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and tl1e Content of Fiducimy 
Dutzes, 24]. CoRP. L. 1001, 1003, 1016, 1027 (1999). Talley refers to intra-firm monitoring, bur his 
reasoning could also apply to extra-firm relationships of trust and confidence, including alliances. 
Moreover, many alliances Qike joint ventures) are organized as firms. 
218. Id. at 1003. 
219. Id. at 1029. 
220. Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracts, and the Bargain Piinciple, 74 CAL. L. 
REv. 1123, 1129 (1986). 
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Some argue that high fiduciary duties are unnecessary, at least in joint ventures, 
because joint venturers are sophisticated and value their reputations. 221 Indeed, 
the parties may be more sophisticated than the court, which may be unable to 
ascertain when the parties have deliberately omitted a term or which implied term 
is most appropriate. 222 Further, one alliance constitutes only part (often small) of 
the business of the parties, who often owe fiduciary duties to others in other 
transactions. Perhaps then, courts should apply lower fiduciary duties here 
than for, say, a law firm, to which the partners devote their full, undivided pro-
fessional attention. 
Although these are good reasons for courts to be cautious in crafting fiduciary 
duties for strategic alliances, other factors argue for high duties. As noted before, 
even sophisticated parties agree to incomplete contracts in strategic alliances. 223 
Thus, failure to specify a duty does not mean the parties decided against such a 
duty, especially if the parties were not equally sophisticated or informed when 
they contracted. Concern for one's reputation does not always deter opportunism, 
especially if the stakes are high and the miscreant expects to keep its misconduct 
hidden. By threatening exposure, courts deter misconduct and spur wrong-
doers to settle before their reputations are tarnished by an adverse judicial pro-
nouncement. Thus, high fiduciary duties do not interfere with but bolster reliance 
on reputation. 
To Francis Fukuyama, the litigation explosion shows a decline of trust and also 
exacerbates it; that is, it is both a symptom and a cause. 224 Some argue that court 
enforcement of social norms actually undermines those norms: "[A]ny effort to 
judicialize ... social rules will destroy the very informality that makes ... [extra-
legal sanctions] so effective in the first instance."225 This seems wrong. Most com-
mentators believe that when the law follows social norms, it bolsters those norms 
and thereby increases trust and social capital. 226 Similarly, the law erodes social 
norms when it ignores them. 
This is why people often fight over laws whose function is mostly symbolic. In 
1954, for example, the Supreme Court outlawed de jure racial segregation of 
public schools. Today public schools are no more racially integrated than in 1954, 
but racial attitudes have changed considerably, and the law's condemnation of 
racial segregation and discrimination is generally agreed to have played a major 
role in this change. Likewise, courts will promote trust and cooperation if they 
read those norms into relational business contracts like strategic alliances. 
Much of the debate over high or low fiduciary duties can be resolved by care-
fully examining the facts of the given case and striving to effect the parties' rea-
sonable expectations. Courts should focus first on the parties' manifestations to 
221. See Shishido, supra note 168, at 73. 
2.22. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
judicial Strategies, 2.1]. LEGAL Sruo. 271, 2.82.-83 (1992) (discussing courts' difficulty in ascertaining 
parties' intentions). 
223. See mpra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. 
224. FUKUYAMA, supra note 44, at 310-11. 
225. Scott, sttpra note 94, at 615. 
226. See Adler & Kwon, supra note 65 (manuscript at 11, 16). 
Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances 89 
each other when they contracted and on their course of dealing under the 
contract. The level of fiduciary duties imposed should then reflect the degree of 
trust and cooperation that the parties have indicated they want. Absent con-
trary evidence, courts should assume that the parties intended to maxrnimize 
their wealth. 227 
Although it is often hard to identify optimal gap fillers and fiduciary duties, 
courts should not abandon the effort and limit themselves to enforcing express 
contract terms. Mistakes will occur, but over time courts can correct mistakes 
and, until they do, it is easier for parties to contract around occasional mistakes 
than to contract around a judicial refusal to imply any terms at all 228 Even if 
courts in some states poorly choose gap-fillers and fiduciary duties, parties can 
avoid these mistakes by a simple choice of law clause dictating that their contract 
be governed by the law of a state whose courts do a better job. 
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
As noted before, the facts surrounding a particular strategic alliance are gen-
erally more important than the allies' choice of form of entity229 Accordingly, most 
of the following discussion focuses on particular issues that are common to all 
strategic alliances rather than on the form of entity An exception is joint ventures. 
]OINT VENTURES 
Joint venturers owe each other the same fiduciary duties as partners do, except 
that duties concerning business opportunities and competition with the other 
party may be somewhat narrower due to the narrower scope of joint ventures.230 
When an alliance is incorporated as a "joint venture corporation"231 the scope of 
fiduciary duties may be uncertain. In some states fiduciary duties in close cor-
porations are the same as in partnerships; in others they are not. 232 
Higher fiduciary duties are appropriate for partnerships in matters where the 
law subjects partners to greater vulnerability than it does shareholders of close 
corporations. For example, a partner is an agent with power to bind the partner-
227. See supra notes 112, 119-120 and accompanying text. 
228. See Eggleston eta!., supra note 24 (manuscript at 30) (asserting that parties are "likely to value 
legal gap-filling, if efficient and fair"). 
229. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text. 
230. See HARROCH, supra note 7, § 2.09(2), at 2-75 ("[l]t is generally thought that a joint venturer's 
fidu~iary duty is somewhat more narrowly circumscribed than is the fiduciary duty owed by a partner 
to h1s co-partner, since a joint venture is typically created for a specific enterprise and is not intended 
to represent a continuing business relationship."). 
231. Id. at 2-75; see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. 
232. Compare Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass . 
. 
1975) ("[S]tockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty 
lll the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another.") (footnotes omitted) with Nixon 
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993) (declaring "no special rules for a 'closely-held 
corporation'"). 
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ship in its ordinary business/33 can dissolve the partnership at any time;234 and 
is personally liable for partnership debts. 235 None of these is the default rule for 
corporate shareholders. Because partnerships are so easy to dissolve (at least under 
the old Uniform Partnership Act), courts imposed fiduciary duties to prevent 
opportunistic dissolutions.236 Such measures are less needed for corporations, 
which are more difficult to dissolve. 
In most respects, though, shareholders of close corporations are just as 
vulnerable as partners, and few disputes between joint venture corporation 
shareholders concern matters in which the default rules for corporations and 
partnerships differ. Accordingly, there should be a strong presumption that 
fiduciary standards are the same for joint venture corporations as for ')oint venture 
partnerships." 
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, THE SCOPE OF THE ALLIANCE 
AND EXCLUSIVITY 
More litigation arises in strategic alliances over business opportunities and the 
scope of the alliance than any other issue237 This fact reflects the difficulty of 
handling the issue by contract. Rapid technological change often blurs the line 
between different industries. Even alliances between huge, sophisticated compa-
nies can land in court. Pfizer and Warner-Lambert had a marketing partnership 
for Lipitor, the top-selling anti-cholesterol drug. When Pfizer made a takeover bid 
for Warner, Warner claimed that the bid violated their contract. 238 
Allies in research and development are never sure what they will discover. 
Disputes can erupt about whether an unexpected discovery is within the scope 
of the venture. It is also hard to predict what opportunities partners will receive, 
so it is hard to define which opportunities belong to the alliance and which may 
be pursued independently or with a third party. Unless otherwise agreed, a joint 
venturer cannot compete with the venture, but it is often difficult to define a 
233. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT (1914) § 9(l), 6 U.L.A. 400 (1995); UNIF. P'sHIP AcT (1994) § 30l(l) 
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 2001); see HARROCH, supra note 7, at 2-74 ("[Ejachjoint venturer 
has the power and ability to bind the other joint venturer and to subject it to liability to third persons 
in matters which are within the scope of the enterprise."). 
234. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914) § 31(l)(b), 6 U.L.A. 77l (1995) (partnership at will). Under the 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 sections 31 (2) and 38(2)(l)(c), a partner may also dissolve a part-
nership for a term at any time, but the dissolution then is wrongful and subjects the dissolving partner 
to several sanctions. Under the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 section 601(1), a partner may dis-
sociate at any time, but dissociation does not necessarily dissolve the partnership. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT 
(1994) §§ 603-807 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 79-96 (1995 &: Supp. 2001) (effects of partner's dis-
sociation). 
235. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT (1914) § 15,6 U.L.A. 456 (1995); UN!F. P'SHIPACT (1994) § 306 (amended 
1997), 6 U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2001). 
236. See supra note 129. 
237. See Glover, supra note 1, at 7. 
238. See Warner-Lambert's Counter-Punch: Pfizer Broke Upitor Pact by Making Merger Offer, DEL LAw 
WKLY, Dec. 7, 1999, at 5. Warner also contended that Pfizer illegally used confidential information 
to make the bid. See id. Glover, sttpra note 1, at 7, also cites litigation between Universal Studios and 
Paramount. 
Gap Fillers and Fiducimy Duties in Strategic Alliances 91 
market so as to determine whether some activity actually does compete with 
the venture. 
Partners can address this problem by defining their alliance narrowly, but doing 
this may impair their cooperation and trust. 239 A partner may withhold valuable 
information, for example, if it fears that the other party may use the information 
to pursue an opportunity on its own. A narrowly defined enterprise may be unable 
to adapt to changing markets and technology: For these reasons narrowly defined 
ventures tend not to succeed 240 Alternatively, an agreement can authorize the 
parties separately to pursue opportunities in the same field as the alliance or even 
to compete with each other. 241 Such terms must be enforced with great care, 
though. It may be one thing for a party to pursue an opportunity that comes to 
it independently and quite another to seize an opportunity brought to the alliance 
by its partner. 242 
Apart from the parties' expressed intentions, the facts of the case may reveal 
their reasonable expectations about the scope of the venture. For example, if X 
knows that Y already has research and development projects with many other 
partners, X should realize that Y will not necessarily share all opportunities it gets 
with X. An absence of other alliances at the time of contracting does not mean 
that the parties intend exclusivity, however. Having alliances with several firms 
brings beneficial diversification. It avoids the risks of putting all one's eggs in one 
basket, including the risk that an exclusive partner will grow slack because it has 
no rivals, or will abuse its exclusive position by acting opportunistically. Moreover, 
one motive for entering an alliance is to exploit some expertise of another firm. 
Neither firm will want the alliance to extend beyond the scope of its partner's 
expertise. Thus allies may want to preserve the freedom to deal with others. 
However, courts should not generally assume that the parties intend a narrow 
scope for their venture. Business people usually favor a broader definition of the 
venture than do their lawyers, and many joint ventures fail or require difficult 
renegotiation because the venture was initially drawn too narrowly.243 Even an 
express definition of the scope of the enterprise could be disregarded if the parties' 
subsequent behavior shows that they have broadened the undertaking. 
TERMINATION 
If partners share the gains (or losses) of an alliance in the same proportions as 
their contributions, and if termination will lead to division of the surplus of the 
239. Id. 
240. See ]OEL BLEEKE &: DAVID ERNST, COLLABORATING To COMPETE: USING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 18, 24-27 (1993) (basing this conclusion on a study 
of forty-nine alliances). 
241. See Charles W Murdock, Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and 
Case Law Developments and TI1eir Implications for the Future, 56 Bus. LAw. 499, 544-48 (2001) (dis-
cussing agreements permitting competition among business co-owners). 
242. See Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 772 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), construing a term to allow 
some partners to seize an opportunity brought to the partnership by other partners. It is doubtful that 
the parties intended to allow this. 
243. See Ernst &: Glover, supra note 183, at 11. 
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alliance and of related business opportunities in the same proportions, termina-
tion of the alliance by a partner should not be a breach of fiduciary duty; but 
termination often does not meet these criteria. Sometimes partners make contri-
butions at different times so that at a given time their capital accounts differ. A 
contract may also allocate more of the early gains (or losses) to one partner.244 
Also, on termination the partners may not share the assets pro rata. For example, 
one may have a liquidation preference or be able to purchase the alliance's assets 
at a bargain price. Lastly, termination may enable one partner to exploit oppor-
tunities that properly belong to the alliance. 
Parties can avoid such problems with a well drafted termination clause,245 but 
they may not even try to draft such a clause because they want to foster trust and 
cooperation by avoiding hard bargaining. 246 A partner who terminates an alliance 
may not intend to grab a disproportionate benefit, but in that case that partner 
can offer a settlement that treats its partner fairly. 
Most distribution arrangements have no jointly-owned assets to dispose of, but 
termination may leave a party with uncompensated sunk costs (like advertising) 
or with assets of little value for any other use. Again, this does not necessarily 
mean the termination is opportunistic. For example, poor performance by one 
party may justify the other in terminating. A threat of termination may; however, 
be brandished against a partner on whom it would inflict serious loss in order to 
extract concessions. 
"Courts have traditionally applied the rule of termination at will to exclusive 
agency and distributorship agreements."247 The terminating party is usually re-
quired to give reasonable notice to allow the other party to recoup its sunk costs. 248 
Schwartz criticizes this rule because determining what is reasonable "requires 
unverifiable information."249 This concern is legitimate but does not outweigh 
opposing concerns. Sunk costs of franchisees (and distributors and dealers) are 
often large250 Due to the costs and vagaries of litigation, terminated franchisees 
will not bother to sue unless their losses are substantiaL 
If a franchisee's losses from abrupt termination exceed the gains to the fran-
chisor, the termination is inefficient. If the franchisor's gains exceed the fran-
chisee's losses, the franchisor should be willing to compensate the franchisee who 
has committed no wrong. If the franchisor is the larger party (as it usually is), 
indemnifying the franchisee for its losses beneficially spreads costs. Indemnifi-
cation then becomes part of the franchisor's cost of doing business, which is 
spread among all its franchisees. Because most franchisees (like other small busi-
244. See LR.C § 704(a) (1994) (permitting special allocation of gains and losses in partnerships). 
245. See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (discussing Russian roulette buyout provisions); 
see Holmstrom&: Roberts, supra note 17, at 84 (describing airline alliance contract requiring three-
year notice for termination). 
246. See supra notes 172-95 and accompanying text. 
247. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 7.17, at 556 (2d ed. 1990). 
248. See Schwartz, supra note 222, at 306. 
249. Id. 
250. See supra note 27. 
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ness owners) are risk-averse, they will accept these costs as insurance against a 
devastating loss from an abrupt termination. 
That a franchise contract does not expressly require reasonable notice of ter-
mination does not mean that the parties deliberately omitted that term. Most 
franchisees are too unsophisticated to appreciate the omission and too small to 
hire sophisticated counsel who would raise the issue.251 A franchisee who spots 
the issue may not mention it because to do so would spoil the optimistic atmo-
sphere of negotiations and possibly signal to the franchisor that the franchisee is 
a troublemaker or does not expect to succeed. If a franchisee does express con-
cern, the franchisor may well reply that it uses a standard form contract which it 
(understandably) resists altering for individual cases. 
The franchisor may also say a written term is unnecessary because it cancels 
franchises only for good cause. This is usually true: franchisors have no reason 
to cancel a profitable franchise unless they find a better franchisee, so it makes 
sense that courts demand only good faith and reasonable notice for termination.252 
Society benefits from a shift to a better franchisee, and a franchisor should be free 
to decide who is the better franchisee so long as it acts in good faith with reason-
able notice. Unfortunately, Congress and many state legislatures have bowed to 
well-organized franchisees (who outnumber franchisors) by imposing onerous 
and inefficient limits on franchise terminations. 
Many disputes in alliances concern the need for further financing. One motive 
for entering an alliance is to utilize another's financial resources, but a financial 
imbalance between the partners can be a problem when more capital is needed.253 
This, too, is hard to handle in advance by contract-the decision of whether (or 
how much) to contribute further to a venture involves too many subjective vari-
ables to be reduced to a contractual formula 254 Without a contract term, though, 
one party may exploit the need for more money to terminate opportunistically or 
to extract unfair concessions.255 Even if the parties agree that more capital is 
desirable, one may be unable to pay its share. Sometimes third-party funding is 
available, but one party may bar it either in good faith or opportunistically 
Thus, for various reasons courts should be ready to halt an unfair termination, 
not only to do justice in the given case, but also to enhance the stability of alliances 
generally. The power to dissolve without fiduciary restrictions invites opportun-
251. Even sophisticated parties may agree to unreasonable termination clauses. See, e.g., Gianni 
Sports Ltd. v. Gantos, Inc., 391 N.W2d 760, 762-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding termination 
clause m contract between two merchants to be unconscionable) . 
. 252. See Schwanz, supra note 222, at 306 (courts require only reasonable notice before termina-
tion). In one study "lf]ranchisors had terminated less than one-third of one percent of their franchise 
~greements over a len-year period." Dnes, supra note 194, at 373 (footnote omitted). They prefer to 
buy out any franchisee who is considered unsuitable." I d. 
253. See HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 68-69. 
254 · Some contracts, however, do commit the parties to furnish further funds and provide that if 
a party fails to do so, its profit share will be reduced. See Glover, supra note 1, at 8. 
1 
255. See HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 68-69, 366-67 (stating the need for further financing may 
a ter division of control). 
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ism. 256 At the least, courts should prevent termination in bad faith, even if the 
contract allows termination for any reason. 
Terminating an alliance, however, may be warranted even if it is harsh to the 
partner. For example, termination may impose a loss on a franchisee who has 
acquired assets that cannot be used elsewhere. A court may then be tempted to 
enjoin the franchisor from terminating because of a minor breach by the fran-
chisee. Franchises, however, are often used when performance by the manager of 
an outlet is hard to monitor and breaches hard to detect. 257 Therefore, franchisors 
justifiably want a right to terminate even for minor breaches so as to deter wide-
spread breaches by franchisees. In return franchisees are often allowed superior 
profits. 258 If courts forbid termination in such cases, the parties will draft alternate 
contracts that are inferior for both. 
CONTRACT REVISION 
A problem related to termination arises when one partner seeks revision of the 
contract. The law rarely requires a party to agree to a revision or even to discuss 
revision in good faith despite changed circumstances. Indeed, a major purpose of 
contract is to shift risks. This purpose is defeated if a party can demand revision 
whenever changed conditions increase the burden of the contract on that party 259 
There are exceptions to the general rule, though. Courts excuse nonperfor-
mance because of "impossibility" or "frustration of purpose," concepts often lib-
erally extended to cases where performance has simply become more costly to 
one party or less valuable to the other than originally expected260 These doctrines 
are particularly important for long-term contracts that involve complex perfor-
mance so that it is difficult to draft for all possible future contingencies. Partly for 
this reason some contracts provide for revision or renegotiation in certain circum-
stances,261 and parties often revise long-term contracts even absent a legal duty 
256. See frankel, supra note 110, at 9 ("When the relationship can be terminated without serious 
adverse effects, interdependence and verification will be weak, and the parties are more likely to 
renege on their promises as more attractive opportunities come along."); see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 
Constructing Firms: Partnerships and Alternative Contractual Arrangements in Early Nineteenth-Centttry 
Amelican Bttsiness, 24 Bus. & EcoN. HtsT. 43, 68-69 (1995). 
257. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 37. 
258. /d. at 267-68. 
259. Gillette states: 
for example, if a buyer and a seller enter a long-term supply contract at a fixed price on the 
explicit understanding that the latter believes the contract price will exceed the future spot price 
while the buyer forecasts the opposite, it would disrupt the very function of the transaction to 
require adjustment by the party whose prognostication proves correct in order to rescue the party 
who guessed wrong. 
Gillette, supra note 75, at 539. 
260. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 E Supp. 53, 80 (WD. Pa. 1980) 
(requiring price increase in aluminum sales contract because of seller's increased fuel costs even though 
contract had a complex revision-escalator clause). 
261. Victor P. Goldberg, P1ice Adjl!Stments in Long-Term Contracts, 3 Wrs. L. REv. 527, 528-29 
(1985); see Oliver Hart & john Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 EcoNOMETRtCA 755 
(1988). 
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to do so. 262 Parties to a long-term contract often do not expect it to be followed 
precisely; it is, rather "a frame-work highly adjustable, a frame-work which almost 
never accurately indicates real working relations, but which affords a rough in-
dication around which such relations vary, an occasional guide in case of doubt, 
and a norm of ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to work."263 A 
party can also request a revision to expand the alliance. 264 
Courts should always be cautious about compelling renegotiation. 265 A claim 
of unexpected conditions requiring revision may be false, a pretext for escaping 
the intended bargain.266 Renegotiation is also costly and rarely increases total 
returns to the parties; it merely redistributes gains and losses between the parties. 
For several reasons, though, courts should more readily compel renegotiation or 
revision of strategic alliances than of routine sales contracts. Because alliances are 
so complex, it is more likely here than elsewhere that a request for a revision truly 
stems from developments that could not reasonably have been covered in advance 
rather than from a false claim of unexpected changes or negligence in negotiating 
the initial contract. Alliances also have a special need of trust and cooperation, 
which are enhanced if the parties can safely expect that their contract will be 
revised if unexpected conditions arise. 
A related problem is determining when parties have implicitly revised a con-
tract. One party may, for example, render performance not required by the con-
tract or overlook the other party's failure to render performance. Again, the key 
question is what are the parties' reasonable expectations. Ordinarily one who 
voluntarily renders services to another is not entitled to compensation, even if 
the other knows of the performance, because knowledge and failure to protest 
alone do not imply willingness to pay for services. 267 As between strangers, it 
makes sense to require clear consent as a condition to a duty to pay. 
Strategic alliances, though, entail close dealings and heavy reliance on good· 
faith, trust and cooperation. Courts would promote efficiency by setting a lower 
standard of consent in alliances, thereby sparing parties the high cost of formally 
renegotiating their contract whenever an amendment is mutually desirable. To do 
otherwise would discourage trust and cooperation in alliances by rewarding those 
who exploit a partner's trust. 
LOCK-INS AND BUYOUTS 
The opposite of the problem of opportunistic termination is lock-in: a party 
who wants to exit a venture may be unable either to dissolve the venture or to 
262. See Gillette, supra note 75, at 536-37. 
263. Karl N. Uwellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.j. 704, 737 (1931). 
264. See, e.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CIV.A.14555, 1996 WL 307445, at *9 
(Del. Ch. June 6, 1996) (stating that a partner may take a corporate opportunity if the partners cannot 
agree on a price at which the partner will transfer the opportunity to the partnership). 
265. See Baird, supra note 92, at 595-96 (arguing against a duty to renegotiate and revise). 
266. See id. at 586-87; see also Scott, supra note 94, at 612-14. 
267. See id. 
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sell its interest therein. This is less of a problem in general partnerships (including 
joint ventures) at will because a partner can dissociate at any time. 266 In an in-
corporated alliance, though, a participant-shareholder may not be able to disso-
ciate. In a contractual alliance, a party may be locked in by a term clause. One 
party may want to exit because it thinks that the other is acting illegally but that 
the illegality can not be proved (or is too expensive to prove) in court. A party 
may want to cash in its interest in a venture in order to pay debts, invest in other 
projects, or retire (in the case of an individual) or liquidate (in the case of a 
business entity). 
The lock-in problem can be handled by contract. 269 An ingenious solution is 
the Russian roulette buyout clause in which either party may demand dissolution 
and name a price for the venture. 270 The other party must then either sell its own 
interest to the first party at the price named or buy out the first party at that price. 
This resembles the classic method for dividing a pie fairly-one party slices the 
pie, the other then gets to choose his piece. In both cases the first party is moti-
vated to divide fairly because the other will pick the better piece if the pieces are 
disproportionate. Moreover, in a Russian roulette buyout parties are deterred from 
dissolving at all without good reason because the value of alliances is usually 
uncertain; even a price named in good faith may prove to be a costly mistake. 
One problem is that a Russian roulette buyout does not work for a party who 
cannot afford to buy out its partner. If, say, one party has a twenty percent interest 
in a venture it values at $100 million, it can invoke the buyout clause only if it 
can raise $80 million.271 This solution also does not work in ventures with more 
than two parties. Further, even when a Russian roulette buyout seems appropriate, 
parties often do not contract for it. 
A variant of lock-in occurs when a third party offers to buy the whole enterprise 
and one owner favors the offer but the other vetoes it so the proponent is locked 
in. This can be avoided by agreeing that one who rejects a sale of the venture 
must offer to buy out the other at the offered price.272 Absent such a clause, the 
opponent might refuse to do this because it lacks the needed funds, does not 
want to concentrate too much on one enterprise, or does not want to lose the 
partner's expertise. Given the ease of making such a contract, courts should not 
268. See supra note 234. 
269. "Termination clauses were treated as very important by lawyers. Irr a typical agreement 
document, approximately 80 percent of the joint-venture agreement's content was devoted to ques-
tions of who would buy out whom, at what price, and who would act as source to whom after the 
venture terminated." HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 365. In one study seventy-five percent of joint 
ventures ended with a buyout. Id. at 4. Most joint ventures have no exit mechanism, though. See 
Glover, supra note l, at 8. 
270. See HARRIGAN, supra note 13, at 99 (describing the arrangement). 
271. A party who can not get this amount can seek a third party to, in effect, buy out the partner 
or the whole venture. To find a buyer is hard, though, because the partner has a right of first refusal. 
A potential buyer !mows it can buy the partner's interest (or whole venture) only if it offers a price 
the partner thinks is too high; and the partner almost surely knows more about the venture than the 
potential buyer, an outsider. 
2 72. See DAVID]. GLADSTONE, VENTURE CAP !TAL HANDBOOK 148-49 (describing such an "unlocking 
clause") (1988). 
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require a partner who vetos a sale to buy out the other unless there is such an 
agreement or the veto is shown to have been made in bad faith. 
In another variant, the majority owner sells its interest to a buyer who does 
not offer to buy out the minority owner. In a partnership (including a true joint 
venture) such a sale is impossible because partnership status cannot be transferred 
(and a new partner admitted) without the consent of all partners.273 In other 
entities, though, such a sale may be permissible. 
In corporate law a sale of control that excludes minority shareholders is gen-
erally lega1.274 This makes sense: minority shares are inherently worth less than 
control shares, and investors should realize this at the outset. If they wish, they 
may agree to a "tag-along" or "take-me-along" clause that requires inclusion of 
the minority partner on equivalent terms in any such sale.275 Again, given the ease 
of adopting such a clause, courts should not impose a tag-along requirement 
unless sale of control will inflict some unusual damage on the minority 
jUDICIAL REMEDIES 
Easterbrook and Fischel inter alia argue against liberal use of judicial remedies 
to resolve disputes in business entities: "Restrictive legal rules concerning invol-
untary dissolution ... create incentives for the parties to establish less expensive 
methods of adjusting conflicts. "276 While there are often cheaper ways of resolving 
disputes than litigation, it does not follow that courts should just refuse to do 
more than enforce contracts. One party to a dispute may simply be unreasonable. 
Moreover, the burdens of an unresolved dispute may fall unequally on the parties. 
If, for example, one party is nearly bankrupt, the other party may exploit the 
chance to extract one-sided concessions. Such opportunism can also injure in-
nocent third parties, like employees, customers and suppliers of the disputants. 
Their interests, too, argue against leaving the parties to stew in their own juices. 
Moreover, "less expensive methods of resolving conflicts" are not limited to 
highly detailed contracts. Many contracts are vague on many points but provide 
for arbitration, which is basically litigation in a different forum. Arbitrators do 
not simply enforce explicit terms; they also fill gaps in contracts. 277 There is no 
273. See UNJF. P'sHJP Acr (1914) § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995); UNIF. P'sHJP Acr (1994) § 40l(i) 
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2001). A partner may assign its "interest"-i.e., its right to 
receive payouts-without the consent of the other partners, but such an assignment does not include 
the assignor's right to participate in management. UNIF. P'SHIP Acr (1914) § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. 736 
0995); UN!F. P'sHIP Acr (1994) § 502 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 90 (Supp. 2001). 
274. See HARRY G. HENN &: jOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS §241, at 657 (3d ed. 
1983) ("Shareholders generally ... may sell their shares for whatever price they can get, and a con-
trolhng block of shares as a practical matter usually can be sold at a higher price per share than 
other shares."). 
275. See]. Howard Clowes, Equity Structures for Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING, 
AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 67, 142-43 (PLJ Corp. L. Practice Law Course, Handbook 
Senes No. 951, 1996) (sample clause, here called "right of co-sale"). 
276. EASTERBROOK&: FiSCHEL, supra note 99, at 240; see generally Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling 
Gaps m the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1992); Larry 
E. Ribstem, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1987). 
277. Arbitrators follow general contract law, which includes default rules and gap fillers. See gen-
erally 11AN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW§§ 10.6.2.1-10.6.2.2, at 10:30-10:37 (1994). 
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reason why courts cannot do likewise when parties do not contract for arbitration. 
If courts refuse to do so, they only constrain contracting parties to resolve disputes 
by means that are inferior to a well-functioning court system. 278 
Of course, fashioning remedies is not easy. A court must decide whether an 
alliance should be salvaged or ended. Only soured relationships wind up in court, 
and litigation exacerbates hostility. Like married couples, though, partners can 
sometimes squabble without divorcing. Some disputes cause one or both parties 
to dig in their heels rather than to seek compromise. One party may seek 
dissolution because it expects to profit from it. If a court indicates that the 
terms of dissolution will not be what that party hoped, it may lose its appetite 
for dissolution. 
On the other hand, a party may act badly (provoking deadlocks, etc.) to goad 
its partner to seek a dissolution from which the former expects to benefit. A court 
can foil this gambit by granting relief other than dissolution or by granting dis-
solution on terms different from those the first party expected. Again, if the court 
hints at such a result, the obstreperous party may become more cooperative. 
Such a change of heart is not implausible. An alliance is born because the parties 
thought it would create value. That they are at odds does not mean they were 
wrong. Salvaging even a marginal alliance may be better than incurring the cost 
of ending it. Of course, an alliance is unlikely to succeed if even one party wants 
to end it. Again, though, during litigation both parties may come to favor a rec-
onciliation. Courts can encourage this by actively promoting settlement-not 
merely exhorting the parties to work things out themselves, but seeking the source 
of the dispute, admonishing realism over the likely result if the case is not settled, 
and exploring possible terms of settlement. 
A court may also grant relief that does not end the alliance by dissolution or a 
buyout. It may, for example, appoint a custodian or temporary director to resolve 
deadlock or curb oppression of a minority partner279 Fear of management by a 
stranger may prod partners to compromise. Even if they still cannot settle the 
dispute themselves, they may be able to cooperate again after the court-appointed 
caretaker has resolved the disputed issues. 
If dissolution is ordered, courts must be careful about its terms. A procedure 
that superficially looks neutral may really be unfair. For example, take the usual 
way of liquidating a partnership by selling its assets at auction280 Some assets 
(like a firm's reputation with customers) have a lower value to outsiders or (like 
2 78. Perhaps litigation should be discouraged because the judicial system is a public expense. The 
public purse, however, can be conserved in better ways, as by requiring litigants who are able to pay 
the court costs they generate. Moreover, litigation produces some positive externalities, such as an-
nouncing default rules that make it easier for private parties to contract. See supra note 206 and 
accompanying text. 
279. See HENN &: ALEXANDER, supra note 274, § 277, at 748-49 (discussing appointment of pro-
visional directors). 
280. UNIF. P'sHIP Acr (1914) § 38(1), 6 U.LA. 880 (1995) provides that on dissolution any partner 
who has not wrongfully dissolved may demand that the surplus (if any) be distributed "in cash." "In 
effect, this gives each partner the right to force a sale of the partnership assets .... "J. DENNIS HYNES, 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC IN A NUTSHELL§ 94, at 188 (1997). 
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much intellectual property) are hard for outsiders to appraise. These assets are 
unlikely to fetch a fair third-party bid. If one party lacks funds to bid the fair 
value of the assets, the other may be able to grab them at auction for a low price. 
To prevent this, a court can fashion different relief-like permitting or requiring 
one party to buy out the other_2Bl 
Determining the parties' rights in specific property or in any surplus can also 
be difficult. Property lent to a partnership is returned to the lender; the lender 
gets the benefit of any increase in its value. If property is given to the firm as a 
capital contribution though, the capital account of the contributing partner is 
credited with the value of the property at the time of the contribution;282 that 
partner gets only a pro rata share of any appreciation of the property. Whether 
property is deemed loaned or contributed depends on the intent of the parties, 
but their intentions may be unclear; one or both parties may not (or claim 
they did not) understand the difference, or they may simply neglect to express 
their intentions. 
A third difficulty under partnership law is that, unless otherwise agreed, capital 
contributions are repaid after dissolution, the remaining surplus is divided equally, 
and partners get no compensation for services to the partnership.283 The rules are 
different for corporations, in which at dissolution shareholders divide the assets 
according to share ownership regardless of the price paid to the corporation for 
the shares. 284 
Suppose, for example, that X contributes laboratory equipment worth $1 mil-
lion andY provides research worth $1 million. The project obtains a patent which 
is sold for three million dollars. If the project is incorporated with X and Y as 
equal shareholders, each gets $ 1 ,500,000. But if the project is a joint venture 
governed by partnership law, X first gets back $1 million for its capital contri-
bution of equipment; Y gets no capital credit for its services. The remaining $2 
million is deemed profit and divided equally. This could be what the parties 
intended, but Y may have expected to be treated the same as X, as would be the 
case if the venture were incorporated with Y as an equal shareholder. 
The three foregoing problems can combine with devastating results. Suppose 
X provided ideas and research and Y contributed $30 million to a joint venture. 
The venture obtained a patent (its sole asset) now worth $100 million; there are 
no debts. There is no contrary agreement, so on dissolution the patent is auctioned 
off. X has little money or credit and can find no backer to bid more than $30 
million for the patent, so Y buys the patent at the auction for $30 million. Y's 
281. This is being done with greater frequency in close corporations. See Thompson, supra note 
109, at 231. 
. 282. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1994) § 401(a)(l) (amended 1997), 6 U.LA. 77 (Supp. 2001). The same 
IS true by judicial construction under the Uniform Partnership Act. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY 
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP§ 7.10(a), at 7:144 (Supp. 2001-2). 
283. DNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914) § 18(D, 6 U.LA. 526 (1995); UN!F. P'SHIP ACT (1994) § 401(h) 
(amended 1997), 6 U.LA. 77 (Supp. 2001). 
284. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 274, § 382, at 1148 (stating that on dissolution, after 
payment of senior claimants, surplus is divided "pro rata among the rest of the shareholders"). 
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capital account is $30 million-the amount of its capital contribution. X's research 
receives no capital credit and its ideas are not deemed property, so its capital 
account is zero. Capital accounts are repaid first, so the entire $30 million from 
the auction goes back toY, which now has a patent worth $100 million at a cost 
of $30 million; X gets nothing for its efforts. Even if X's ideas were deemed 
property contributed to the venture, they would be appraised as of the time of 
the contribution, when their value might have been quite low. 
X is better off if the venture is incorporated with X andY as equal shareholders. 
They would then share the $30 million equally Moreover, under most state laws y 
could not dissolve the corporation unilaterally, as it can if the venture is a partner-
ship. X might be able to block dissolution and thereby extract a better deal from Y. 
If X is in financial straits, though, it may have to accept an unequal division of the 
profits. An assertive court could impose a fairer result. First, it could order Y to buy 
the patent for its fair value of $100 million. Second, even under partnership law a 
court could find an implied agreement to split this amount equally rather than giv-
ing Y a preference for its $30 million cash contribution265 
What should a court do absent clear evidence beyond the circumstances of the 
parties? Because the parties agreed to split profits equally (either by express con-
tract or by virtue of the default rule), they probably valued X's ideas and services 
as equal to Y's cash contribution. 266 It is most unlikely that X intended Y to be 
able to grab an asset worth $100 million for $30 million. A court may not need 
to impose this result through a final judgment. If the court makes clear that Y 
cannot grab the patent with little or no payment to X, Y may agree either to 
continue the venture with X or to pay X fair value. To do otherwise and press for 
unilateral advantage would risk further delay and costly litigation and damage to 
Y's reputation. 
An equal split also makes economic sense. It encourages trust and obviates 
costly drafting and bargaining that erodes trust. In other words, it promotes the 
formation of wealth-creating ventures. Although this result is less profitable to Y 
than traditional partnership rules would produce, it should not discourage Y from 
entering into alliances. If this is not a result Y would have agreed to, it can easily 
insist on a specific contract providing for a different result. 
285. A court could reach this result by finding a tacit agreement to give X a capital credit of $30 
million for its research and ideas. In the extreme a court could find that X merely lent its ideas to the 
joint venture and that these ideas, including the patent that grew out of them, must now be returned 
to X. The venture then has no assets and has suffered a total loss of its $30 million of capital-i.e., 
of Y's contribution. X, having made no contribution itself, would have to pay Y $15 million to equalize 
their losses. See UNIF. P'sHIP ACT (1914) § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 526 (1995) (providing that partners share 
losses equally unless otherwise agreed); see also UNIF. P'SHIP AcT (1994) § 401(b) (amended 1997), 6 
U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2001) (providing that partners share losses equally unless otherwise agreed). X 
would still be much better off than in other scenarios. It is unlikely that a court, however, would find 
that the original ideas, much less the patent that grew out of them, were property belonging to X. 
286. Again, this would be the default result if the venture were incorporated with X andY as equal 
shareholders. 
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PAYOUTS 
In neither partnership nor corporation law is a participant automatically enti-
tled to payouts from profits. Payouts must usually be authorized by a majority 
vote-of partners in a partnership, of directors in a corporation.287 This require-
ment generally makes sense but can produce unfairness. Suppose X and Y are 
equal owners in a new firm which after six months has a $200,000 profit. X needs 
money for personal and family expenses. Also, if the firm is a partnership or is 
taxed like one,288 X must pay income tax on her $100,000 share of the profits 
even if she has received none of it. Y, however, vetos any payout. Y may just prefer 
to reinvest the profit in the firm, but Y could also use the veto as a ploy to extract 
concessions from X. Unless X can prove in court that Y is acting in bad faith, X 
is probably not entitled to any legal relief. Even if X can show bad faith, she may 
not be able to wait for judicial relief. In either case she may be forced to make 
concessions to Y in order to get a payout. 
The same problem can arise in an alliance between firms. One firm may need 
money to pay creditors, including employees. Here too a denial of payouts will 
disappoint the party's reasonable expectations. The lack of a contractual formula 
for payouts does not necessarily belie such expectations. Formulas are difficult to 
draft. Many venture agreements do require payouts of a specified portion of profits 
to cover the owners' taxes thereon, but even these provisions are an exception, 
and requirements for higher payouts are rare, being generally limited to entities 
with predictable income and expenses. 
Courts can prevent such oppression if they will go beyond traditional rules. 
One remedy is court -ordered dissolution with X being cashed out. The mere threat 
of judicial dissolution may persuade Y to approve reasonable payouts. If it does 
not, a court can impose a payout policy.289 This poses some of the same problems 
that arise in drafting a contractual payout policy. A court, however, can amend 
an order in light of later events; revising a contract, by contrast, requires the 
consent of all parties, some of whom may behave strategically. Moreover, owners 
can escape a court-dictated payout policy by reaching their own agreement at any 
time. Thus, it again makes sense for courts to act on their best estimate of the 
parties' reasonable expectations. This approach is not only best for the parties 
before the court but also minimizes the cost of drafting complicated payout for-
mulas that, despite best efforts, may not work very well anyway. 
GOAL DEFINITION 
Parties to a strategic alliance may disagree about goals. Even when they share 
from the same pool of profits, they may disagree about risk or the desired timing 
. 287. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 282, § 6.02(c), at 6:22 (Supp. 1999-1) (distlibutions 
m partnerships generally require majolity vote of partners); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 6.40(a) (Supp. 
1998/99) (saying board of directors may authorize distributions to shareholders). 
288. Other non-corporate entities Oike limited liability companies) are taxed like partnerships 
unless they elect otherwise. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-3 (2000). 
289. See Murdock, supra note 241, at 529 nn.161-64 (discussing cases requiring sufficient payouts 
to cover an owner's taxes on entity income); Smith v. At!. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Mass. 
1976) (ordeiing shareholders of close corporation to negotiate a dividend program). 
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of profits. Such disagreements rarely threaten to destroy an alliance, though. In 
litigation courts can reasonably assume that the parties intended risk neutrality290 
and maximization of net present value unless a contrary intent is shown. 
Disputes over goals arise more often if the parties are not just sharing a single 
pool. One party may have separate interests that conflict with the goal of maxi-
mizing the value of the joint enterprise. For example, research may point toward 
a new product that would compete with an existing product owned by one of 
two equal parties. That party may oppose development of the new product, from 
which it would get only half the profits, at the expense of the existing product, 
from which it gets all the profit. Each party has a general right to expect that its 
partner will not hamper the alliance solely to protect an existing product. 
In some cases, though, this expectation may be unreasonable. For example, 
should a manufacturer expect its distributors not to sell competing products? The 
answer is usually no, but much depends on the specific facts. 291 Another problem 
arises when parties do not get constant, fractional shares of profits. For example, 
a distributor may pay the manufacturer a fixed price for a product and keep all 
the profit from resales. The manufacturer then will want to maximize sales-for 
example, by minimizing resale prices. The dealer wants to maximize its profit, 
which may dictate higher resale prices than the manufacturer wants. 292 
In neither of these cases is it reasonable to assume that the dealer will fail to 
maximize the parties' joint profits if the dealer acts so as to maximize its own 
profit. Accordingly, a manufacturer has no right to expect a dealer to curb its 
profits for the benefit of the manufacturer, and courts should not require the 
dealer to do so. If a manufacturer wants a dealer so to behave, it should specifically 
contract for such a duty 293 
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
For lawyers, negotiating strategic alliances is unusually tricky Most alliances 
are major, complex, long-tenn transactions whose contracts require great care. 
Lawyers play a crucial role in focusing clients on difficult contractual issues. 294 
The usual behavior of lawyers, however, does not enhance the trust that allies 
want and need.295 This is not surprising. Rules of professional responsibility direct 
290. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. 
291. See jOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS§ 58, at 221 (3d ed. 1990). 
292. See Rubin, supra note 29, at 229; Klein&: Murphy, supra note 37, at 270-76 (discussing 
maximum resale price provisions). 
293. Some contracts specify the level of effort a distributor is required to make. See GUTTERMAN, 
supra note 5, at 10.018-10.020; Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 E2d 609, 613-15 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(stating that a beer distributor was not required "to bankrupt" itself promoting products for which it 
had promised to maintain a "high volume of sales," but it did have to take measures inconsistent with 
maximizing its profits). 
294. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. Business lawyers can also play a useful role 
in educating inexperienced clients about what to expect in negotiations. See Mark C. Suchman &: Mia 
L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 
21LAw &: Soc. INQUIRY 679, 699-700 (1996) (discussing role of lawyers in educating entrepreneurs 
who seek venture capital financing). 
295. See supra notes 183 and 187 and accompanying text. 
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lawyers to represent their clients zealously.296 The rules do not require lawyers to 
seek maximum advantage for the client or to insist that every possible contingency 
be covered in contracts, but they breed attitudes and habits that incline to such 
behavior. Law schools encourage these attitudes by stressing litigation. Profes-
sional competition among lawyers for money, influence, and prestige reinforces 
these attitudes. In many areas of practice-not only in litigation but also in many 
business transactions-these attitudes and habits are useful. In many financings, 
of mergers and acquisitions, for example, the parties will not deal with each other 
at all, or not in a way that requires trust and cooperation, after the contract is 
signed. In such cases, a lawyer's aggressive tactics may serve the client well. 
Aggressive lawyers, however, can erode the trust needed for a successful rela-
tional contract. It is not surprising, then, that business people pursuing such a 
contract tend to exclude lawyers as long as possible and then minimize their 
participation.297 Ideally, lawyers would participate fully in negotiations, but would 
act so as to enhance trust. To do so, lawyers would have to overlook issues they 
would ordinarily raise and make concessions that they would ordinarily resist. 
They would offer compromises rather than waiting for the other side to offer 
them. The small, close-knit group of Silicon Valley lawyers specializing in venture 
capital financing seem to have embraced these attitudes 298 
This behavior will not come easily to many lawyers, not only because it is so 
atypical but also because it runs against the natural inclination to seek a larger 
fee by raising as many issues and fighting on them as long and as hard as possible. 
In the long run, though, lawyers-both individually and as a profession-may 
gain from becoming more cooperative. As they do so, clients will involve their 
lawyers sooner in order to enjoy their help in achieving the agreement that max-
imizes their mutual interests. 
The rapidly growing use of in-house corporate lawyers stems in part from their 
more constructive attitude, a result of the keener acculturation of in-house lawyers 
to the company's business needs. When house counsel is unavailable, clients can 
encourage constructive behavior by giving their lawyers appropriate instruc-
tions.299 These instructions should be communicated to the other side so that all 
understand that a lawyer's cooperation is not a sign of incompetence or weakness. 
Contracting parties may even want to use one lawyer as mediator rather than 
two lawyers as advocates. Professional rules permit lawyers to play this role and 
296. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (l) (1996) ("A lawyer should act ... with 
zeal m advocacy upon the client's behalf."). 
297. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
298. See Suchman &: Cahill, supra note 294, at 700, 704. In this group conditions are unusually 
favorable for the flourishing of these norms: the practice is heavily concentrated in a small geographical 
area, the main players know and repeatedly interact with each other, and contract terms are becoming 
standardiZed. Id. at 690, 701-04, 706-09. These conditions do not hold for lawyers involved in 
strategic alliances. 
299. Not surprisingly, social scientists have found that people are more likely to cooperate when 
they are mstructed by an authority to do so. See generally David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in 
Soaal Dtlemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY &: Soc'y 58, 78 
Cl99S) (summarizing results of prior studies). 
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they often do so when individuals want to set up a business300 Again, this may 
only seem to shrink the role and fees of lawyers. Unlike many business people, 
good business lawyers are experienced negotiators and drafters. If lawyers act 
constructively, clients have every reason to maximize their role. 
CONCLUSION 
The need for businesses to innovate continuously and rapidly in a high-
technology global economy has precipitated a proliferation of strategic alliances. 
This development presents the law with what is in effect a new form of business 
entity. Although most partners in strategic alliances are themselves business firms 
and generally competent to defend their own interests, the complexity of strategic 
alliances makes it inevitable that contracts by which they are created will exhibit 
large gaps. Because of these gaps, the parties must rely on trust and cooperation 
to succeed. Fear that one's partner can act opportunistically without penalty un-
dermines trust and cooperation. 
Accordingly, courts play an important role in supplying the gap-filling default 
rules and fiduciary duties for strategic alliances. The courts' task is complicated 
by the division of alliances into many categories-including joint ventures, fran-
chises, dealerships, distributorships, licensing arrangements, and "strategic in-
vestments"-and by the remarkable variety of relationships within each of these 
categories. With careful attention to the facts of each case, courts can fashion rules 
that curb opportunism in strategic alliances without imposing burdens that pre-
vent joint wealth maximization. By so doing, courts would boost the growth of 
this crucial sector of the economy by making it easier to draft contracts for stra-
tegic alliances and less dangerous to sign them. 
300. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2(a) (1996) ("A lawyer may act as intermediary be-
tween clients if" certain conditions are met.). 
